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DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY?

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BY

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To the late
DR. JOHN SCOTT HALDANE
with affection and admiration

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
PREFACE	ix
INTRODUCTION	xi
I. ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME	1
II. THE MIDDLE AGES.	10
III. RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION	15
IV. THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGN STATE	22
V. RISE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY	30
VI. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION	37
VII. HEGEL AND MARX	46
VIII. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION	59
IX. DEMOCRACY	67
X. THE RISE OF COMMUNISM AND FASCISM	80
XI. CHURCH AND STATE	102
XII. CONCLUSION	110
BIBLIOGRAPHY	117
INDEX	119

PREFACE

THE greater part of this series of studies was given at different times in lectures under the auspices of the University Extension Movement and the Workers' Educational Association. Their purpose is to give a brief account of how the religious, political and economic forces are interwoven in the life of the people and how the outstanding changes in European government have been brought about.

It is hoped that the studies will prove helpful to that growing section of the working and middle classes who are interested in the problems affecting changes in government in the countries concerned, and who have neither time nor opportunity to consult the larger individual works.

W. D. S.

HAWKSTONE HOUSE,
MYNORS STREET,
STAFFORD.

INTRODUCTION

ECONOMICALLY and scientifically, the world to-day is a unit ; politically and spiritually it was never less so. Japan, seeing herself between the United States and Russia, is feverishly afraid of encirclement and is at the moment engaged in annexing China. Russia, seeing herself between Germany on the West and Japan on the East, both bitterly opposed to Communism, is already armed to the limit of her capacity, utilising her enormous resources for economic self-sufficiency and for rapid mobilization in case of war. She has also gone far towards securing her western frontier by a treaty with France. Germany and Italy visualize themselves as faced by France and Russia, both strenuously opposed to their aspirations. France is distracted both internally and externally by the present world situation, while Great Britain has ceased to be insular, for the conquest of the air has robbed her of her security, and she has been forced for better or for worse to re-arm in order that her word may count for something, both with actual allies and with potential foes, in a world where, apparently, force has still the first and almost the last word.

It seems clear that the world is rapidly reverting to a state in which it will be difficult to avert war with its inevitable recrudescence of barbarism. Unilateral disarmament is impossible in a world where unilateral breach of treaties is possible. The problem of British security, at one time a comparatively easy two-dimensional problem of land and sea, is now a three-dimensional one of land, sea and air, and is not only difficult but dangerous.

We are now within about three days of Australia by air and rather less from South Africa. By the advance in aviation the ends of the earth have been brought into new

and alarming proximity. Our erstwhile distant enemy is now camping on our door-step. Science in the last hundred years has made the world one vast neighbourhood ; religion has not yet made it a brotherhood. At the moment there is no adequate balance between the spiritual and the material forces in the world ; the latter by far outweigh the former and the new science has increased this predominance in an alarming way.

It looks as if a new presentation of the Gospel with a broader conception of religion were needed to cope with the the new situation in the world. No one can be content with anything less than a real catholic religion as the background for the new situation which has been precipitated by the scientific and economic unity of the world, a gospel that can in every land give guidance to men of all shades of opinion in the perplexing problems of this age. We see that everywhere in the Old World liberal ideas and ideals are in retreat. The state of culture we thought firm and permanent only a few years ago is now decried as an uneasy equilibrium where man stands half-way between an ape and a machine, and democracy, that form of government which came directly out of these liberal ideas and ideals—is to-day almost bankrupt. But is this failure not due entirely to the too-narrow application of the Christian expression ? Firstly, within the nations themselves there has been the neglect of human claims and their subordination to the machine for the sake of profit, and secondly, as between the nations, there has been an absence not only of generosity but even of justice from the international standpoint, with a consequent loss of faith and confidence.

There has been, moreover, too easy an assumption of superiority on the part of the European nations with regard to the Eastern races, and we in turn are surprised and hurt at the criticism of some of the latter who see in Western civilization only a material development without any real signs of the spiritual element. Rudyard Kipling's statement that " East is East and West is West " is in reality a dangerous fallacy, for the two have already met both scientifically and economically, while, given fair conditions,

they should also increasingly have met spiritually. But European capital has found in cheap Indian, African and Chinese labour a fresh field for exploitation, and the horrors of the early factory system have been repeated with, in addition, even more wicked housing conditions in Africa and the East. Unscrupulous Oriental financiers and employers have not hesitated to learn the lessons taught by the European industrialist. These, together with the sex-appeal of film stars, have misrepresented the culture of the West and bred in the Eastern mind an anti-European nationalism, in a desperate effort to arrest the demoralization of their peoples by Western industrialism and films of vice and crime.

Not since the early days of Islam has Christian civilisation faced such a grave crisis. It may be indeed that even in Europe, Germany and Russia will become lost provinces of Christianity as did North Africa in the great Moslem invasion, which was finally checked at Tours. The case of Italy is different because there religious diversity is not at the moment a source of national disunion, as the incompatibility between an absolute Church and an absolute State has not yet become quite apparent, but this can only be a matter of time. The whole situation as it appears to-day is quite akin to the situation that existed when Christianity was confronted with Islam. The corporate State bears more resemblance to Islam than to any other spiritual movement in modern history, in its fanaticism, its deification of force and its intolerant treatment of those who disagree with it. In fact, it would seem as if the garments of Western civilization had been torn in two. For more than fifteen hundred years Europe has been—nominally at least—part of Christendom, and has based its policies on the recognition of the Christian faith. It is indeed significant that in certain States in Europe that profession prevails no longer : they have found a new faith based on a discovery or a revelation they have made for themselves.

It is of course much too early to make any attempt to assess the permanent value or importance of the new situation, but that it is critical for the Christian witness is beyond

all doubt. We can only wait and see whether the cruder ideas of the life and destiny of man, and the reversion to what appears to be the cruder principles of social and economic organization represent a real change in modern European thought and action or whether it is simply another of those temporary throw-backs to which the forward movement of civilization has been subjected from time to time. It may be that Nazi-ism is a throw-back to primitive religion; it may be that Sovietism is a Messianic religion without the stern moral strictures of the Prophet, and it may be also that Italian Fascism, based on force and the methods of Machiavelli can be rescued and maintained by being put on the spiritual basis of St. Thomas Aquinas. That there is a fundamental resemblance between all three ideologies is beyond question. Each of them claims to prescribe and to dictate the nature of truth, freedom and justice. Their appearance as forms of government marks a crisis in the history of Europe and the world, and it will be the business of this book to examine in some detail the causes for their advent.

CHAPTER I

ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

IN order to understand the religious and political situation in the world to-day in any comprehensive way we must take a wide historical view, for the roots of European religious and political theory are to be found in the practice and speculation of the distant past. But, although it is essential that the historical view should be wide, it is not necessary to consider every detail, or even every important detail of history throughout the intervening years, but only those dynamic movements of thought and action whose impact upon society has played a conspicuous part in the development of Western civilization. This will involve a study of religion and religious institutions, and an acquaintance with the changes in political and economic thought that took place from time to time, for religion, politics and economics are inextricably interwoven in the web of history.

The problem to-day, for example, is one which turns primarily on the social-economic basis and the social-economic structure of society. The conflict is between different ideals in the realms of politics and economics—a conflict mainly between the ideologies of Fascism and Communism in the sphere of politics, and between private and public enterprise in the realm of economics. This is fundamentally different from the old religio-political battles where the masses of the people, uneducated and untaught, were merely passive.

To-day, with the spread of education and the greater spread of propaganda, with mass philosophies ranged against mass philosophies, great self-conscious masses of the people are in the fray hanging attentively on the issues of the

struggle while many are actively engaged in its deliberations and its vicissitudes. The problem therefore is one of vast dimensions and for the purpose of examining it we shall begin with a brief study of the Greek city-state, for political theory begins with the Greeks.

Greek democracy was fundamentally different from modern democracy in the respect that it applied only to city-states, of which Athens is the best example. It was democracy only in the broad sense that it was not oligarchy, as only a minority of the people were enfranchised and consequently only a few people had any say at all in the government of the city-state. True, the government was vested in the body of the citizens, but citizenship was conferred only on the adult male freemen. Thus, democracy was not representative but direct. The Assembly (*Ecclesia*) was the sovereign authority and all citizens were not only entitled to attend, but by the fourth century were even paid to do so. Legislation was put through and regularized by means of the "Boule," council of five hundred. Citizens of thirty years of age and over were eligible for election to the Boule, and in turn most of them sat in it. But although only a minority of the people had the vote, it was nevertheless a form of democracy, which had been arrived at through Monarchy, Aristocracy, Plutocracy and thereafter Tyranny, and incomplete and bad in some respects as it was, it marked a long step forward in the ordering of human affairs. Political decisions were made by the body of the people, though indeed only a minority, after peaceful discussion. The round table method of settling disputes and grievances had been evolved and it had a chance to grow.

At this period the Greeks thought they were the only people that constituted the civilized world and in this they were not far wrong, though of course they were not entirely right. Outside the sacred circle of Hellas they saw nothing but barbaric darkness. They knew nothing of farther Asia until the voyages of Marco Polo were published at the end of the thirteenth century. The existence of China had never been suspected, so that the two chief civilizations of the world grew up in complete ignorance of each other. It was

amid this ignorance of the outside world that the Greek city-state grew and flourished, and that great thinkers and philosophers, men like Pericles, Euripides, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all of whom made a deep impression upon the idea of the city-state, lived and died.

But it is with Plato and Aristotle that we are here concerned, as their philosophies penetrated the future to a much greater extent than any of the others. Plato in his *Republic* showed that he was both a philosopher and a politician; in fact, his political theory is his philosophy, and his philosophy is his political theory. For him there were three parts in the human soul, (1) the Philosophic—that which knows, (2) The Spirited—that which is full of zeal and bravery and (3) the Appetitive—that which seeks bodily satisfaction. Plato believed that there was a corresponding tripartite division in the structure of human society. He contended that the philosopher-king stands supreme above all others, which in the *Republic* meant that the philosopher, the man of knowledge, was to rule with brave and zealous soldiers under him and an appetitive population, kept well in subjection, to do the wish of the community.

It will be noticeable that the society here envisaged is an aristocracy and not a democracy. All democratic ideas are pushed aside and Plato argues that in a man's own soul the best part should rule—a conception which is later sustained in his doctrine of "function." Thus at the very dawn of speculation in the formulation of political ideals we are confronted with the dilemma "Should a man, because he is a man, be given political rights or should these rights be based upon knowledge and governed by education; and further, if these rights are given to the ordinary man, would not government in time degenerate into the babel of tongues and the rule of the mob?" For Plato, the man of knowledge was the best man to rule. This does not mean that Plato was a Fascist. It is true that he had some ideas which are akin to Fascism but then so have we all; even Russia is not free from Fascist ideas.

In these matters one must have a regard for historical evolution and a due sense of proportion. It is futile to

transpose the views of ancient philosophers from the setting of their times into the complexities of the modern world without great qualification. Plato is cited by some as a Fascist and, on the other hand, by many as a Communist, but both contentions are equally absurd as Plato was a citizen not of a nation-state but of a city-state, a member of a civilization composed of small-scale industries, based largely on slave-labour. Plato was an aristocrat, but the aristocracy in which he believed was that of the intellect. The philosopher-king was to rule ; he was to govern by consent since he had the knowledge of what was good and just. In Plato, the philosopher-king was a wise man, ruling by the eternal light which flooded his soul, and not as the mouth-piece of a party. More than any other man of his time, he inspired the minds of the people. He gave an impetus to the advance of civilization, for he expressed the mind which alone can maintain a free society. The whole of Plato's writings must be examined in the light of his idea of freedom. The philosopher-king was first of all a philosopher and only became king afterwards, because in less intelligent hands the authority would be in danger of becoming authoritarian. That is not Fascism ; it is, indeed, a sound maxim, so sound in fact that it would be well for some modern democracies, especially on their industrial side, if they would give heed to it.

In his *Republic* Plato has made a complete examination of the human soul, but in making the examination he finds it difficult to reconcile his definition of " man," with the existing ancient world and its institutions. He is unable to transcend the limitations of his own social environment and therefore finds it quite beyond his power to illustrate the idea without falsifying it. Hence his incursion into politics, his appreciation of slavery, his government by a caste—in fact, his acquiescence in all the things which one might see in action in a modern Fascist state. But what of the idea itself, the idea underlying personality as a reality which is inherent in all human beings in virtue of their humanity ? This is something which has survived the political and ethical setting of a city-state, and in fact is the basis

of the Christian doctrine of personality. Such a conception is the exact antithesis of Fascism.

Plato's successor, Aristotle, was much more of a realist. Both men thought in terms of the city-state, but Aristotle tried to build up his theory of society upon a biological conception, maintaining that man is a social animal, whilst Plato's conception was concerned more with the spirit. This is a significant distinction which has echoed through later periods of history.

Aristotle defended the system of slavery on its merits. He thought the city-state the highest form of civilization and one which marked the Greeks off from the Barbarians. He was interested in the forms and methods of government. He recognized that all government was imperfect, but sought to distinguish between the good and the bad on the basis of an elaborate study of comparative institutions of different States. He was less concerned with the individual than Plato, but between them Plato and Aristotle determined the shape and gave the form of political theory to many future generations. Aristotle's influence on political theory was strong and vital throughout the Roman period and the Middle Ages. It passed on unbroken into the modern world, whilst Plato's influence, eclipsed for a time by the Fall of the Roman Empire, was revived at the Renaissance, and still plays an important part in the formation of political ideals. Plato is still to-day one of the most widely read of all political philosophers.

But for both Plato and Aristotle the city-state was primarily a society and only incidentally a state. It was ethical—furnishing the norm of right and duty ; political—solving the problems of liberty and authority ; juristic—embodying in its institutions the foundations of law ; economic—determining the conditions of a material prosperity, and sociological—in that it revealed the principles that not only produced the best men but also the best form of association among men. And, moreover, all this came under the head of the city-state and its politics. For Plato and Aristotle, as well as for their great teacher Socrates, the view that an enlightened people like the Greeks should submit them-

selves to the doctrine of man being governed by man was irrational. That might be good enough for slaves or those who had not developed the city-state. As there was undeveloped "nature" there would be inequality of power, and control should be by the stronger. In the political community the life lived by the individual might appear at different times to be determined by the oligarchy or by the common people or by the Tyrant, but in the city-state the real and ultimate authority rested in the city-state as a society and not in any one or more individuals in it.

The Greek city-states could hardly be called successful politically as they consistently refused to unite, and therefore political independence was very early lost. The history of Greece indeed was one long failure to create an empire. Civic unity she might have achieved but for her futile attempts to weld together along with herself people of other races. It was not in the art of practical politics that she was supreme.

ANCIENT ROME

Rome succeeded precisely in that sphere wherein Greece had failed so signally, but Rome was not hampered in her imperialism by a democratic constitution. It was the Roman belief that all men who counted for anything in the world should live in cities as much like Rome as possible. Accordingly Rome became the standard, and every excavation of a Roman city discloses monuments, baths and public buildings which differ very little from each other. This great similarity was not confined to externals. There were also the common language, the common legal institutions, and even the endeavour was made to establish social classes and social institutions similar to those found in Rome itself. This standardization was remarkably successful. In fact, it was the conformity to a common ideal which was the main driving force within the whole system. Much, of course, can be said against the Roman system, and, indeed, against the Roman character. The Romans were not a merciful people, nor were they always just in their dealings with others. Yet their political

system as a whole aimed at the practical realization of universal justice, and in fact no other nation has ever succeeded to the same extent in turning its subjects into loyal and devoted citizens. Moreover, the wide differences of birthplace seem to have affected hardly at all the relations of citizens of the Empire. St. Paul, for example, claims with equal pride his citizenship of Rome and Tarsus.

The rise and fall of the Roman Empire is one of the cardinal epochs in the history of the world, and tomes of literature have been written about it; but here we are concerned not so much with the historical course of the great Empire, as with the religious, political and economic thought that prevailed within it.

The Romans were a pagan people who worshipped various gods and goddesses. Their paganism was a pleasant, unmoral, tolerant creed which was easily harmonized with popular festivals and amusements, of which indeed it was an integral part. It answered to none of the claims of intellect, nor did it satisfy the needs of conscience. To the thoughtful men and women, therefore, philosophy, which, from the time of Zeno and Epicurus, had been engaged with the problems of behaviour, offered a wider and more satisfactory field for thought and deliberation.

In the society of the second century the philosopher played an important rôle as spiritual adviser, performing many functions which afterwards fell to the father confessors of the Roman Church. Under the very worst of the Roman tyrants, the stoic philosophers were courageous enough to defend the full dignity of man. Stoicism, in fact, was the finest contribution which the pagan world gave to religion and the art of right living.

Politically speaking, Rome began as a city-state and only later developed into the imperial city of a great empire. The Romans, like the Greeks, passed from monarchy to aristocracy and thence to a form of democracy. But the Roman democracy was unable to cement a great and growing empire which could only be governed and held together by a highly concentrated central power vested in a single ruler. Unlike the Greeks, the Romans were a very practical-minded people

and any political theories they have bequeathed to the world have come down to us in a strictly practical form. By means of planning and building, and with the assistance of a large army which finally became a permanent force, they set out to create a great empire. Active in all directions, they worked with what in these days would be called mathematical precision, building up a great legal code in order to guide them. Their legal system was influenced by the Stoic philosophy, especially in its international aspects, and thus acquired an expression of great rigidity in standardization. This rigidity was their final undoing, because they came into conflict with the modern world, with the more elastic Germanic conceptions of voluntary institutions, which, although a natural spontaneous growth, were nevertheless able to withstand the Roman power.

The Romans left us no books on political theory but they left us a great monument of Roman Law. This, of course, was an important contribution to political theory, permeating as it did both the canon and civil law of the Middle Ages; and the theory of the sovereignty of the State which still dominates the modern world issued directly from it. Moreover, the idea of absolute monarchy and also certain fundamental ideas in international law came from Rome.

So far as economics is concerned, there does not seem to be anything in the Roman's system of education to direct his mind to the grave social and economic problems around him. The absence of any organized system of production in Roman society, accompanied as it was by a lack of economic forethought, brought about the devaluation of the coinage during the third century, which in turn brought about the complete downfall of the middle classes. The whole outlook, of course, both Greek and Roman, was coloured by the institution of slavery. In the first century of the Empire, slaves were so plentiful that they revolutionized the land economy of Italy; but no attempt was made to evaluate the productiveness of slave-labour with that of free labour. Again, production was hampered by the fact that there were so many occupations in which

a freeman could not take part without loss of dignity. Plato, for example, thought that the retail trade was degrading ; while Lucian, although admiring the statues of Praxiteles, was glad that he had not been asked to take part in producing them. Such, indeed, was the economic outlook of the Romans, that although the system comprised an association of towns and townships, these did little or nothing to supply a market for the surrounding country. The wealth that was squandered in Rome during the first century did not, in fact, come from their own country but came from the spoils of the conquered East.

It may be said then that only the political experiences of Greece and Rome have had any great influence on the modern world. But this influence, especially that of Plato and Aristotle, has been both important and far-reaching in the making of Europe and hence in making to a great extent the American Continent. The fact, however, should not be overlooked that their influence applies only to Western civilization and that it may not continue to apply for ever even there. The greater part of the continent of Asia was almost entirely untouched by the Greco-Roman ideas and ideals, and the historical explanation of the political life of China and India is to be found, not in the classics but in the teachings of Confucius and the traditional life of China, in the Indian village community and the doctrines of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Moreover, we are not without strong indications to-day that new types of institutions, also alien though not so alien, may prove more fertile in the East than the remains of Plato's teaching or the Roman Canon Law. Communism and Fascism have reared their heads there and their roots are different from those visualized in the Greek city-state.

CHAPTER II

THE MIDDLE AGES

THE Middle Ages is the name given to that period of European History which lasted from the capture of Rome, in A.D. 410, by the Visigoths under Alaric the Bold, to the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. For many years previously, Rome had been fighting a losing battle against the barbarian hordes who had now crossed the Rhine and the Danube, the most terrible of these hordes being the Huns under the leadership of Attila. Finally, Rome was vanquished and sacked and the great Empire fell. The Dark Ages had set in: Rome was despoiled by the fighting chieftains, but fortunately for posterity, the great books produced by the Greek and Roman scholars were not entirely lost. Copies were carefully preserved and re-copied in the monasteries of the Benedictine monks. St. Benedict, born in A.D. 480, was one of the beacon lights of the Dark Ages and the monks who were his followers were ordered to read, study and copy the manuscripts.

During the whole of the Dark Ages, Europe was the scene of wars, famine and pestilence, and the only protection the people had against the tyranny of their over-lords was the steadily increasing power of the Church. St. Augustine, who was born in 354, was inspired by the capture of Rome in 410 to write his famous work *The City of God* in which he declared: "The greatest city of the world has fallen in ruin, but the City of God abideth for ever." Here we have the keynote of that religious thought which dominated the Middle Ages; the foundation of what is commonly known as the Mediæval Synthesis—the City of God standing

out sharply against the city of man, eternity against time, purity against sin. To St. Augustine there was the City of God founded on the eternal rock and the City of Man founded on shifting sand. He listened equally to the cry of the Pagan and the plaint of the Christian for the fall of the great Empire and understood both, for his father was a Pagan and his mother a Christian.

The Pagans blamed the Christians for the fall of the great Empire. "Rome has perished in the Christian days," they said, and they pointed to the great times when their forefathers worshipped Mithras, Isis and Cybele. The Christians naturally repudiated the charge but were troubled to think that the conversion of the Empire to Christianity had not saved it from impending disaster. St. Augustine, feeling the urgency of the problem to which the fall of Rome had given rise, set himself to examine the whole situation and if possible effect a compromise between the rival factions. In doing so he made explicit what had been implied in Christianity from the very beginning, that it was a philosophy of history. He urged that all catastrophes, including the present one, were in keeping with the Eternal Will of God. "If it is the fate of earthly dominions to pass away, is there a city which endures?" "Yes," says Augustine, "the city that shall have no end is the *Civitas Dei*."

The political theory of the Middle Ages was based largely on Roman and Greek foundations. The conception of Universality was taken from Rome and the idea of Society as natural to man, from Aristotle, though in truth, neither of these conceptions was well worked out in practice. This fact has often given rise to the view that the Middle Ages were essentially unpolitical, but such was not the case. On the contrary, the Middle Ages left behind them much brilliant political theory from the time of the early Canonists and Civilians to St. Thomas Aquinas. The weakness lay in the fact that they were unable to adapt their theory to the complicated political and social changes of the Mediæval World. It is true that so far as mediæval feudalism is concerned, they had no theories at all, but there were

theories in St. Thomas Aquinas about the 'two powers'—Church and State, the common basis of human society and the relation of the individual to property, in regard to rights and duties, all of which were vastly important. But the dominant quality in mediæval thought lay in treating politics and economics as branches of morals and subject to the writ of religion. The Church was transcendent both to the State and to economic expression; it regulated right conduct not only in the realm of politics and the State but also in the sphere of economics.

This is what is known as the Mediæval Synthesis, with the Church governing in all spheres and the writ of religion running through them. The hand of the Church may be seen in the realm of economics, in the elaborate codes prohibiting usury and defining the conditions under which profits can justly be made by a Christian, whilst in the region of politics it appears in the attempt to derive all authority in the State and all principles of obedience in the subject from the Will of God as manifested in the Scriptures and in the inspired utterances of the Church. It was commonly acknowledged that the spiritual was above the temporal power. Leaders of thought and action, in the later Middle Ages, were agreed on the principle of a seat of authority in religion, a supreme spiritual arbiter in temporal affairs, an institution professing the rule of sanctity and justice as an ultimate tribunal before which they might lay their cause.

This concordat of religion, politics and economics, with the writ of religion in control, stamped the thought and activity of the Middle Ages evolving a system which is very different from that practised in the modern world. The Church to-day is certainly not transcendent to the State nor even co-equal with it, nor has it any great say in the determining of economic forces within the State, whether that State is a dictatorship or a democracy, though perhaps it has less in the former than in the latter.

The merits of the system are not up for our consideration but it might be as well to point out in passing that there is a growing view, which in some quarters is becoming almost

a commonplace, namely that the problem of the relation of Christianity and economics was solved in the Middle Ages.

This is a view which cannot be lightly ignored, especially by those who believe that in the turmoil of European and international troubles only a right relation between Christianity, politics and economics can solve the problems. There are those, no doubt, who will still protest that religion is one thing and politics and economics another, and that the Church should be concerned only with the former and the State with the latter. It is, of course, true that there are the things which belong to Cæsar and the things which belong to God. But it is far too simple a solution of the matter to say that the things which belong to Cæsar are the political and economic life of the people, and the private and only the private interior life, to God. That is a false separation between Christianity and economic expression which has been the means in the past of doing a great deal of harm in the world and, unfortunately, is still continuing to do so. But even if this is admitted, it still remains a question whether a return to the mediæval synthesis would really be a solution to the problem and whether it is not a new synthesis that is required which would set out better the functions of Church and State in order to give more general scope for the development of man's personality.

In every political decision that is reached two different elements are involved. There is always the element of spiritual and moral principle and there is always what may be best described as the technical element. Perhaps the technical element is essentially Cæsar's but the moral principle is always God's. That is why Christianity cannot keep out of politics, though it need not identify itself with any particular programme, policy or party. Wherever moral issues are concerned the Church of Christ cannot stand aside as a disinterested spectator. There is a Christian industrial, social and international order, and there is an order which in all these spheres Christianity can never countenance.

In the Middle Ages the economic and social theories were mainly those propounded by St. Thomas Aquinas and the early Canonists. St. Thomas was less radical in his views than some of the early Fathers. He did believe that some forms of private property were legitimate, though he held that such property is not found in natural law. He further devoted considerable thought to the problem of buying and selling and he contended that advantage must not be taken of the necessity of the buyer nor might the buyer take advantage of the ignorance of the seller, and he concluded, in spite of the views of the earlier Fathers to the contrary, that certain forms of trading were lawful but that it was dishonest to engage in the exchange of commodities if the object was gain and not a modest livelihood. He admitted the morality of moderate rent from houses, but interest from anything else, whether in money or in kind, was unlawful. The only form of interest that Aquinas would countenance was a small sum so as to secure the lender against the loss of his capital. He condemned speculative trading or gain resulting from the skilful use of the markets. The adequate reward of labour was a proper living wage and this must be considered in determining the price of commodities.

These economic maxims are not only to be found in Aquinas and other encyclopædists but are an integral part of the Church Law. As the Canon Law, or Church Law, was only very gradually codified, at first these rules of conduct were found only in floating traditions and customs, but in course of time they were developed and modified in accordance with the particular tendencies of the age. The law of the Western Church lays down the maxim that in God's original intention for the world, the use of all that is in the world was to be common to all men.

CHAPTER III

RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

FOR almost six hundred years after the death of St. Augustine, Europe was enveloped in darkness, the ancient classical learning being preserved only in the monasteries. The Renaissance was that period in which the revival of learning took place, with its consequent impetus to art and literature.

The causes of the great awakening can only be summarized here. In 1453 the Turks captured Constantinople and consequently there was an immediate exodus of scholars to Italy, taking with them Greek philosophy and Greek literature which had become almost unknown in Western Europe. A century before, the Italians had learned from the Moors how to make paper, and the first printing press had been set up in Metz in Germany ten years before the dispersion from Constantinople. Moreover, in 1492 Columbus discovered America and as a result of this discovery men obtained a new and bigger idea of the world. Religious, political and economic ideas were revolutionized, and a spirit of active inquiry in all spheres heralded the Reformation. The effect of the new learning together with the discovery of America and its material wealth, at once tended to narrow the sphere in which the writ of religion ran and an immediate attempt was made to secularize the political and economic forces, though this was not accomplished effectively until the Reformation in the case of the former, and the Industrial Revolution in the case of the latter, three centuries later.

The one man with whom we are particularly concerned at this point is Machiavelli, who perhaps did more than

any other to secularize the political thought of his time. Born in Florence in 1469, the year in which Lorenzo the Magnificent began a period of principality uncrowned (1469-92) and during which time the city of Florence attained the summit of its glory and the undisputed leadership in thought, art and scholarship of the Renaissance, Machiavelli began his public life as a follower of Savonarola, who was at that time trying to save Italy through the preaching of religion and moral reform under French domination. He however soon left Savonarola, with whose gospel, in fact, he had never had any sympathy, and set out on his own to show that the State was an end in itself. Machiavelli was beyond all else a prophet and a preacher of the principle of patriotism and the idea of the national State. But his State was a non-moral one because he believed and asserted that statesmen must be willing and ready to commit acts of violence if the exigencies of the State should demand it, and moreover that in the case of the State the end always justified the means, as ethics had no relevance to politics.

For the part he played in this national movement he was regarded by the Church as an immoral cynic; but perhaps Machiavelli was not so much a cynic as he was devoid of any great belief in either God or man, a thinker who was trying to find a basis for political thought more in the general behaviour of man than in the Scriptures or any *a priori* set of moral principles or conditions. He set out in his well-known work, *The Prince*, those principles which are best described by the German expression 'Realpolitik'. Machiavelli wanted Italy to become a strong and powerful state—Italy a nation—and he saw the one hope of this in the creation of a purely secular and authoritative State, powerful enough both to keep out the foreigner and to subdue ambitious Popes seeking temporal power. But in making this his aim he subordinated to his State all morality and fair dealing between men and in consequence produced a complete travesty of political thought. At the same time it must be added that his work contained some notable ideas even if they were immoral in their immediate teaching.

Machiavelli like many another had great destructive powers of thought but his constructive thinking was poor, indeed it was definitely inferior to that of the other thinkers of this period who influenced the general course of religious and political thought almost as much as he did. Cervantes in Spain, Erasmus in Holland and Sir Thomas More in England, whose famous book *Utopia* was obviously based on Plato's *Republic*, all played an important part in opening up the way for the Reformation, which, however, was in any case inevitable.

The Reformation was the first of the great watersheds in European history and one of its main effects was to liberate political thought from theology in a revolt against mediæval authority, and in this connection the name of Martin Luther stands out as the chief protagonist of the movement. The influence of Luther was not restricted to his native Germany: his bold challenge rang throughout Europe. He claimed that Europe had been moving in a wrong direction for a thousand years, and inferred that the Papacy was an imposture, the special sanctity of the priesthood a fiction, and that rites, institutions and ceremonies bound up in the life of Europe were unnecessary. It may be said of Erasmus that he aroused the curiosity and whetted the appetite of the people for the Reformation, but there is no doubt that it was Luther who carried through the great revolt.

The Reformation was partly religious and partly political. The religious opposition came from within the priesthood and the political from without. The revolt from within would have been speedily suppressed by the Universal Church had it not been for the power of the German princes outside, who were fighting the battle mainly on political and economic grounds. Thus Luther was forced to ally himself with the national States and to defend the claims of the secular rulers to absolute monarchy, a position which involved him later in a fierce denunciation of the Peasants' Revolt. Religion had now become a matter of individual conscience and direct interpretation of the Scriptures without the mediation of the inspired Church, the Lutherans

becoming in politics the defenders of absolute monarchy to a degree which was even a menace to their own religious freedom.

For more than a generation after the first protest from Luther, Germany was the centre of the Reformation movement, but had Protestantism depended entirely for its success on the movement thus inaugurated in Germany, it is doubtful whether it would ever have obtained, apart from Germany itself, any strong foothold in Europe or survived the counter-attack which the Church of Rome in due course was to deliver against it. Lutherism was, in fact, not a good fighting creed ; it was not sufficiently simple and straightforward to appeal to the masses who had no great interest in theological controversy. Its outlook was conservative and pacifist and its political allies were the princes rather than the common people. Even in missionary zeal it was conspicuously lacking and consequently by the middle of the sixteenth century it had to be supplanted by another and better form of Protestantism in order to lead the movement against Rome.

This new form of Protestantism was French in origin and its great leader was John Calvin. Calvin was born at Noyon in Picardy in the year 1509. While engaged in the study of law at Orleans and Bourges, Calvin came under the influence of the Lutheran teachers. In 1534 he was compelled by the increasing severity of the Government's measures against heresy to take refuge in Basle. There he published the first edition of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, a confession of faith containing the essential principles of his later teaching.

Calvin differed from Luther in almost every respect ; in the expression of his personality there was nothing in Calvin resembling Luther's coarseness, his gaiety, his humour, his peasant superstition and his morbid self-criticism. Calvin was the studious polite young Frenchman who was never more at home than when among educated men and women of noble birth. He was a master of his subject and could present his case in a simple way, thus obtaining a great power over large masses of the people. He used his influence

in an endeavour to bring back to the world the Christianity of the first three centuries. This he thought could be done through the preaching of the 'Word' and the binding of Church and State together in a rigid moral code.

It may be said that Calvin's revolution was cold and austere, with Church and State alike as instruments for the administration of the laws which were quite as rigorous as anything that had existed in the Middle Ages. It may even be said too that Calvin was the Pope of Geneva in a far more exacting sense than there ever had been a Pope of Rome, and that his institutions are thoroughly mediæval both in tone and character. But all this is comparatively unimportant. The real point is that the instrument he devised to sanction his codes was democratic, and for the first time in the history of Europe real democracy was introduced by Calvin for his Church, which was later copied and elaborated by Rousseau for the State. Calvin had to set up a new means of Church government as he had broken away from the traditions of the Roman Church, and he did this by means of concentrating on the collective will and activity of the body of the faithful. Moreover, he was compelled to furnish the State with an army which would defend his Church and this also he did by calling upon the same body of faithful people. It will therefore be seen that although it may be said that Calvin's Church was not a complete democracy, it did contain a strong element of real democracy, appealing less to the authority of the Church, ruling by right and prescript, than to the sustaining force of its own congregations. Thus, basing its administrative side on the democratic ideal, Calvinism became a strong force for self-government and particularly when in a minority position resisted the persecution of the State.

Indeed, Calvin's Church and the Presbyterian Church, which was the outcome of Calvinism, quite unquestionably gave to Europe a powerful impulse towards democracy and self-governing institutions and was certainly the most vital single institution, during a time of rapidly changing economic conditions, in setting up democratic forms of

government and social organization. Even in our own time and in our own country, the democratic ideal has been both deepened and fortified by men whose only training was received in the courts of the Church of Scotland.

But such a revolt against the Universal Church as was engendered by the Reformation was bound to bring in its train a counter-Reformation. Spain had not been touched by the Reformation and had fallen away greatly from the leading position it had held among the nations a century before. The throw-back of the Reformation had settled mainly in Spain with its strong clericalism and feudalism, and out of this land of mystics, monks, pilgrims and soldiers there arose a man named Inigo Lopez de Recalde, better known as Ignatius Loyola, who was destined to play an important part in later events. Loyola, a knight of noble birth and a soldier, was wounded in the battle of Navarre (1521), and during his convalescence conceived the idea of forming a Society of Jesus which later became known as the Jesuits. The fundamental idea of this society was to educate, much better than had been done hitherto, those who were to preach and hear confessions. The society was formed in 1534 in Paris, and although it may be historically inaccurate to say that it was formed for the express purpose of combating Protestantism in Europe, in fact that is practically what it did do. About the fifties of the century the Spanish priests went to Germany to form Catholic schools and colleges for the purpose of restoring the Catholic faith, and in a very short time their influence in combating Protestantism was felt all over Central Europe. A crowned Jesuit, Ferdinand of Styria, was the prime mover in the Thirty Years War which broke out in Bohemia, spreading rapidly over Europe and involving in a more or less degree almost every European State. The centre of the conflagration was the German Empire and as a result Germany suffered severely. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marks the end of this long war and finds Germany with her population reduced from sixteen millions to four millions, and whilst at the

beginning of the sixteenth century Germany had been in the forefront of European civilization, especially in art and literature, by the end of the Thirty Years War she was reduced almost to complete barbarism.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGN STATE

WE have now reached a point in our study when we can take a long-range view of the modern world. The Reformation not only secularized political thought but made possible the rise of the Nation State. The channel in which the writ of religion was now running had been narrowed. It was the age of the New Science of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo and the National Sovereign State. Moreover, the Christian civilization of Europe had been brought into contact with Mexico and Peru, the Spice Islands of South America and the archipelagos of the Pacific. America had been discovered and Protestantism supplied a fresh stimulus to England's commercial duel with Spain.

The world was a much greater and wealthier place than ever men had conceived it to be, and the people of the maritime countries set out to capture its wealth. The spread of exploration was due in the main to the growth of science, and it might have been expected that the religious bond of the Christian Empire would have been strengthened and the rule of Law enlarged over the barbarians who were now brought within its scope. But no! The writ of religion had now almost gone and sheer naturalism in science and materialism in economics had taken its place. Science knew no religion or ethics, wealth was fair game, and at any price.

Indeed, at this point it is fair to ask why it was that the forces which were to bring about the first fruits of internationalism in economics did not lead also to an increase in the area in which the writ of religion would run or, at least, to some kind of political internationalism. It was

certainly not for lack of voices insisting on the duties and responsibilities of the Christian Commonwealth towards its new barbarian subjects. The great Spanish jurists were constantly pointing out that Christian duty and National Law were not bounded by geographical frontiers and that they applied to American Indians as much as to Europeans, but the spirit of freedom of thought and action, which, in fact, was no real Freedom at all but only sheer unbridled licence to grab, could not be controlled. The spirit behind Christopher Columbus in his explorations was now running through the body-politic of all Christendom, breaking down its moral fabric.

Machiavellianism had come home to roost, and political theory, bereft both of its religious sanction and its universalism, found a new resting-place within the sphere of the Sovereign State. Thus Sovereignty became secular, and, within geographical limits, claimed an absolute obedience to the State which had now become arrogant, self-centred, tyrannical and warring—the same barrier then as to-day to real co-operation and internationalism in the world.

In England the Sovereign State had been established, at least in a manner, as far back as the fourteenth century, but the political theory governing such a State only took shape proper in the midst of the great conflicts of the seventeenth century. Apologists and antagonists alike of the Divine Right of Kings, from James I himself to Sir Robert Filmer, fought it out with Puritans like Milton and Algernon Sydney, leading up to the English Revolution of 1688.

The English Reformation was the least religious in character of all the reformations ; in fact, it was as secular as it is possible for any nominally religious revolt to be. The Church of England set out on its new and independent career, accepting the theology and morals of the Roman Church. There was only an institutional break which, fundamentally, was the substantial difference between the two Churches. This institutional break, however, did mean the abandonment of the idea of universality ; and the declaration of the Church's independence paved

the way for the complete Sovereignty of the English State.

This raised a difficult question as the English Church had now become almost a branch of the English State, while at Geneva the State had become almost a branch of the Church. Calvin's great idea had been to bring Church and State together, but with the Church as the dominant partner, and at Geneva he had actually accomplished this with remarkable success. Calvinists were therefore not satisfied with what had been done in England, and so a new movement was started by Richard Hooker to bring into the fold all the King's loyal subjects, whether Calvinist or Roman, on the basis of good Englishmen.¹ This was certainly an ingenious compromise, but Hooker's broad-mindedness was a little before its time, and for a century circumstances were too strong for his solution to prevail. England, like the rest of Europe, plunged into warfare in which questions of religion and politics were predominant. It was, however, during the seventeenth-century conflicts that Hooker's political theory really began to take shape, but it is not our intention to pursue these conflicts as it is more important for our purpose to make an examination of the religious and political theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The rest of this chapter, therefore, will deal with a study of these three philosophers with a view to showing how religious and political theory vacillated in the next hundred years.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was a Machiavellian. He was strongly opposed to supernaturalism and therefore attempted to apply to the whole world of reality the kind of mechanistic expression which the early scientists had been endeavouring to apply to physical phenomena. He was influenced both by Galileo and Descartes, and accordingly his naturalism was of the extreme materialistic kind—the world a machine in which matter and motion are the sole ultimate realities. He knew nothing of physics or mathematics and was at home only in the realm of political theory, although even here his greatest virtue was in pro-

¹ See Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

voking opposition. His flair for mechanization was his constant undoing; to him the world was an ordered machine and therefore the greatest need of society was order. There must be a power in society armed with absolute authority so as to enforce order and prevent society from breaking down. Unlike Aristotle, who had regarded society as natural to man, Hobbes thought it an artificial condition where all men were at war with each other. The institution of Society was thus represented as a purely rational act which however had been performed by men for the purpose of self-preservation and, therefore, must have order imposed upon it by an absolute authority so as to keep it from falling to pieces. Justice was to be imposed by the Sovereign, through law, thus creating a social contact between Sovereign and people, so that Hobbes, although not the originator of the doctrine of the Social Contract, did attempt to apply this idea to political theory.

The Divine Right of Kings had now gone, but in going it had left absolutism without a theoretical basis. Hobbes gave to it a new secular foundation, but the absolutism which he advocated did not necessarily belong to a single ruler but to the government of society whatever form it might take. He preferred government by monarchy, because he believed that, of all forms of society, it would be able best to impose order; but he recognized that his ideas could be applied equally well to aristocracy or democracy. His views on political theory were not accepted in his own time. The Cavaliers rejected them, though he claimed to be on their side. They wanted Divine Right for the King, whilst the opponents of monarchy naturally wanted to curtail the King's power, and the Puritans, striving to base their rule on theological and not on secular grounds, completely disclaimed his views, thus leaving Hobbes without a follower. It was not until the next generation, when the conflict had taken on a new form, that Hobbes's influence began to assert itself.

Hobbes was succeeded by John Locke (1632-1704).

Locke had a great influence upon the ordinary intelligent man in the street—"His influence," says Adams, "far exceeds his fame". Most of his followers do not know their master.¹ The reason for this is obvious. Locke at once set himself to bring down philosophy from its ambitious cosmic speculations to the study of human knowledge, its nature and its limitations. He maintained that man does not know the real essence of anything and, in fact, is strictly limited to his experience. Hence it is impossible to say whether the soul is a spiritual substance or a material substance endowed with the capacity to think, because our ideas of substance are vague and cannot be justified by sense-experience. This obviously was an appeal to common sense. Locke's great work, the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, was published in 1690 and his two treatises on Civil Government appeared about the same time. In the second of these treatises he set forth his views on the origin and nature of political power. "Men are," he says, "by nature, all free, equal and independent and remain so until by their own consent they become members of a political society. The state is thus created by a compact of individuals to increase and preserve their natural rights."

Locke follows Aristotle in recognizing that society is natural to man and therefore rests his case on a different psychology from Hobbes. He derives his principle of politics from the Laws of God and Nature and not, like Hobbes, from an act of human reason which entirely alienated man from God and the sphere of nature. At the same time he owes something to Hobbes, for his social contract could not have been formulated as it was, if Hobbes had not provided the basis for it.

But the real difference between Hobbes and Locke is that Locke distinguishes between society and government and Hobbes does not. In Hobbes, the people set up a sovereign and that is an end to their authority, as all power is thereby transferred from them to the Sovereign and his successors for all time. But not so with Locke. With Locke the

¹ *Herbartian Psychology*, p. 33.

authority must remain vested in the people with powers at any time to change the Government if it happens to be unsatisfactory. Thus the more oligarchic system visualized by Hobbes served as the framework for Locke's democratic theory of limited and constitutional government. If ever a philosophy was vindicated by events, it was the Whig philosophy which lay behind the English Revolution of 1688 and John Locke was its great exponent.

From Locke and his scientific contemporary, Isaac Newton, supported by Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, a body of rationalizing thought passed into France where it was immediately seized upon and developed to such an extent that the institutions of that country seemed, in comparison to the English Constitution, to be outworn and obsolete. Voltaire popularized the new English theories. He had been in England for three years (1726-9) and had read Locke and Newton, Bacon and Shakespeare. In his letters *Sur les Anglais* (On the English), published in 1733, he tells of this surprising society in England where men were free to publish what they liked, where religion was so free that a sect called the Quakers had even the courage to denounce war as unchristian. "An Englishman," he writes, "goes to Heaven by the way he pleases." Moreover, he pointed out that everyone paid taxes and the peasant in England ate white bread and was not afraid of adding to his hoard in case his taxes be raised the next year.

A little later (1729-31) Montesquieu came to England also for the purpose of studying the conditions there. "England," he writes, "is the freest country in the world. I make no exception of a republic and I call it free, because the Sovereign whose person is controlled and limited is unable to inflict any imaginable harm on anyone."¹ Montesquieu based most of his ideas on Aristotle's theory of the analysis and comparison of institutions past and present, rather than on any *a priori* principle. In the *Esprit des Lois* (Spirit of the Laws) he lays it down that the true secret of English liberty was to be found in the separa-

¹ Montesquieu, *Travel Notes*.

tion of the judicial, executive and legislative powers. This was an adaptation from Locke and was not strictly correct, though at the same time the concept played a very important part in the history of political thought in the succeeding century.

But no one influenced the masses of the people in Europe at this time more than Jean Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau was not a scientific materialist ; he was a man of vision who, like all great reformers, allowed his vision to play on his natural instincts and emotions. Finding Europe a mass of corruption and tyranny he set himself at once to draw the outline of a society in which a good man could live : in other words, the essence of his master principle was virtue.

It may be said of Rousseau that not only his theories but his whole life was a mass of contradictions, yet at the same time he was a reformer who said many things that were needing to be said and which perhaps the average man merely felt subconsciously, and could not say. It may be true that Rousseau was not a moral, nor strictly a spiritually-minded man, but he brought men's minds back to a sense of the religious and the value of the spiritual in life in an age of Reason. In the earlier sections of his *Contrat Social*,¹ he displays himself as an extreme individualist, a passionate lover of Freedom, and, in the later sections as well as in his Political Economy, he advocates a complete collectivism, and was the first man to make democracy a live issue in the realm of politics.

Rousseau was not a scholar : he was essentially a leader of the masses of the people and the thing that mattered for them was not so much his consistency in thought as his power to give emphasis and practical point to the democratic ideals. He had no training in systematic thinking or formal logic, but he was a well-read and well-informed man, whose instinct and judgment were almost unerring. Moreover, his political philosophy was based almost entirely upon his religion. The opening sentence of his book *Contrat Social*—"Man is born free but is

¹ *Contrat Social* : Social Contract.

everywhere in chains"—was not only a challenge to civilization but struck France with the force of a new religion.

Born in Geneva at the time when the influence of the Calvinistic gospel was being most keenly felt, Rousseau obtained his ideas from the Bible which, in fact, was the basis of all Genevan education. To the scheme of salvation which was propounded and preached by the Calvinists he added the political theories of Hobbes and Locke. From Hobbes he took the idea of sovereignty as unlimited and indivisible, which arose in society the moment the social contract was completed, and from Locke the distinction between sovereignty and government, making the people sovereign and the Government only a secondary and derivative power subject always to the sovereign general will of the people. Thus in Rousseau's hands the theory becomes democratic, for in contradistinction to Locke he determined that the will of the people should be active in carrying on the work of society and not merely passive in its government, so that, in fact, what men learned from Rousseau was not only to believe in popular sovereignty but in democracy as well.

In short, Rousseau's political theory is simply a rationalized plan of salvation for a city-state, as conceived by Calvin for his Church: it is, indeed, a pretentious theory of civil religion designed as a creed, to which every citizen must subscribe in order to escape banishment from the State. His doctrine of the General Will is subject to various interpretations, and each generation seems to interpret it in its own particular way. In our own, for example, Rousseau is invoked by Fascists as well as Democrats, each seeing a justification in his writings for the particular system which they uphold. But for many the conception of the General Will as a simple and single volition of the body politic is Rousseau's great contribution to political theory. This idea presupposes an organic theory of the State which inevitably leads to Collectivism and Socialism.

CHAPTER V

RISE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

At this point it will be necessary to show the rise of political economy. Formerly, religion and politics mainly held the field but from now onwards economics plays a greater and more important part in the scheme of things. France and Germany had reached the stage when they wanted to be clear of the shackles of feudalism. England had for long been practising commercialism and had a State established on that basis. Locke and Sir William Petty had written on economics but their theories were concerned mostly with points about State policy rather than an economic system. But by the end of the eighteenth century the Industrial Revolution had begun and it gave rise to a new class of "bourgeois," a class of industrial capitalists whose interests were ranged against the established system of the combined land-owning and commercial classes of the early eighteenth-century Whig aristocracy.

The Industrial Revolution had liberated economic forces from politics just as the Reformation had liberated political forces from religion ; but it was in France and not in England that these forces took shape as a unified concept of an economic society. Both France and England, influenced as they had been by the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau on the one hand and the natural science of Bacon and Descartes on the other, had undergone a considerable change in outlook. Formerly philosophy had been dependent upon religion, now it was dependent upon natural science, although, in fact, it ought always to have been self-dependent.

It was out of this confusion of ideas and ideals that a

school of economists arose in France called the Physiocrats who, obviously from their name, were going to apply the same principles to economics as already had been applied to political philosophy. Political Economy was to be governed by natural law. They believed that if Nature were allowed to work out her own unfettered economic salvation, it would bring untold wealth to mankind. The old mercantile system, they held, had to be regulated by the State in order to prevent its complete breakdown. The new economic system based on natural law would "go by itself" and would only yield the best results if left free and unfettered. This was the beginning of the Liberal and Free Trade ideas which later came to Britain through the teaching of Quesnay and Adam Smith.

The underlying conception in this system was that a free economic system would play the same part in the body politic (in the circulation of wealth) as a free circulation of the blood would do in the physical body; thus the Physiocrats conceived economic forces in analogy with a natural organism. Quesnay, in his famous *Tableau Economique*, puts the case to show that only in agriculture was there a real net profit and consequently the needs of the State should be met by a single tax on agricultural values. This, of course, is not entirely true but it is not so far from the truth as it was at first believed to be; moreover the Physiocrats did see the important fact that all trade is an exchange of goods and services and that any restriction put upon them by States is likely in the long run to be harmful.

The Physiocrats occupy a basic place in the history of economic thought, taking as they did their ideas from both Western and Eastern civilizations. The ideas taken from the West include those of Plato among the ancients, Sully and Vauban among the French, and Hobbes, Locke and Hume among the English. For their ideas from the East they owe a great debt to China. The new trading arrangement between Europe and the East had brought Chinese ideas of economics directly to France. One of the larger works of Quesnay was *Le Despotisme de la Chine*,

and Turgot's chief economic treatise was prepared for the guidance of two young Chinese students who were about to return to their native land after having received a religious education in France. Again Pierre le Pauvre became a missionary in the Far East, subsequently entering the employ of the Company of the Indies in which capacity he travelled widely in Pacific waters and lived for some years in China. He delivered a series of addresses to the Academy at Paris in which he extolled the Chinese economic systems. The Physiocrats hailed him as one who had made a valuable contribution to the troubled economic situation in France.

In addition to the economic influences from China which acted upon the Physiocrats, there were also a number of significant currents of general intellectual influence from China to Europe, which had come through as the result of general geographical discoveries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Trading with China, for example, had a far-reaching influence upon European thought and action. Artists were charmed with the fine Chinese and Japanese painting on silk ; architects imitated Chinese roofs and other features ; Chippendale and others imitated the Chinese furniture, and porcelain factories were set up, not only in various parts of France but also in England. Indeed, the whole intellectual movement which arose in Europe at this time received a good deal of its stimulus from ideas that came from China. The movement reached its height in France in the eighteenth century, making its influence felt, not only in Physiocratic economics, but also in many other fields.

The chief economic ideas that emanated from the Physiocrats were the introduction of a single tax on land and the abolition of the internal duties on the grain trade in France. It was easy to show that such policies if put into practice would not only give a quick return to the Government but also would improve the prosperity of the whole people. Such an argument, however, could make no appeal to the people of the time. It was much too utilitarian. It had to be shown that the single tax and

free trade were required by Nature and by Nature's laws. This was done by Quesnay in his *Natural Right*¹ and by Mercier de la Rivière in *The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies*.²

The great object of the Physiocrats was to put economic thought in line with current political theory; economic theory as well as political theory must conform to Nature's laws and where French philosophers found the beneficent "nature" that must restore human happiness, in psychological truths and moral virtues, the Physiocrats found it in the conditions determining the production and use of material wealth. This meant a restriction on Government interference in industry and economics, and Gournay, the earliest of the school, made the world familiar with the famous formula for the Government's most effective method of promoting commerce and industry "*laissez faire, laissez passer*."

Turgot, the eminent statesman, though perhaps too broad in his philosophy to be called strictly one of the Physiocrats, nevertheless gave a great deal of support to their theories both in his public utterances and in his writings. He advocated their theories in regard both to agriculture and industry, and even in finance he attempted to apply their principles, and although he was unsuccessful in the latter sphere, yet his ideas made a profound impression on the thought of the time. His policy included sweeping reforms of the land tax, the abolition of the guild monopolies and a general free trade policy in the commerce of grain. Every economic proposal was accompanied by a philosophy of nature as an explanation and defence of the measure.

Events were now rapidly shaping for the revolution in France and the free trade doctrine found conditions in Britain more suitable for its development. It was taken up by Adam Smith (1723-90) who was influenced considerably by the Physiocrats though he was much more interested in specific questions of economics and in advancing the

¹ *Le Droit Naturel* (1765) in *Physiocrates*, p. 41, by Quesnay.

² *L'Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques* (1767), by Mercier de la Rivière.

practical thesis, than in any matter of conceptual unity. Ricardo (1772-1823), on the other hand, was probably more in the direct line of the Physiocrats. He was, as they were, very concerned to establish a unitary principle by which to interpret at least the major phenomena of the whole economic system. Ricardo was interested in the new industrial class that had arisen and he was anxious to shift the burden of taxation as much as possible from their shoulders on to those of the landowning class. In his view, rent was an unfair exaction from the industrialists, for the benefit of the non-productive landlords. Ricardo was therefore the economist of the industrialists. So also, of course, was Adam Smith, but the latter was more interested in the building up of economic science as a rational and consistent whole in the tradition of English empiricism. Ricardo was a business man with a financier's eye to wealth ; Smith was a moral philosopher as well as an economist. At the same time, Adam Smith, no less than Ricardo, exulted in the vast accumulations of wealth that the introduction of machinery and the sub-division of labour in a free-trade system would bring about.

Free Trade was a paying concern ; industrialism was now getting its chance. Britain was made the workshop of the world, but it was left to Karl Marx, almost a hundred years later, to show the tragic ravages of this system as it had been applied upon the masses of the people. Wealth was now being made rapidly in industry, whilst the conditions of the workers were deplorable. Women and young children were employed both in the mines and factories under conditions that were revolting for a so-called civilized people. The shameful housing, the disparity between wages and profits, all these atrocities, part and parcel of the early Industrial Revolution, failed to attract any attention from the people at large or to stir any sympathy among their legislators at Westminster. It was left to Karl Marx to show up the dark side, where Smith and Ricardo had seen mainly only the brightness.

The writ of religion, moreover, had now vanished, both in the domain of politics and economics ; and philosophy

which had freed itself from the crushing power of theology, had fallen into the still worse slavery of autocratic and despotic science. The Puritans, in their ardent desire to oppose theological dictation, too willingly linked themselves to the more despotic naturalism, entering with grim determination into the industrial field, especially in cotton, coal and iron. The new system did much to rapidly industrialize Britain but the cost to the workers was a heavy one. In half a century (1760-1821) the population of Britain rose from about seven millions to almost thirteen, and, in the meantime, the whole face of the country had been changed, from that of the free open spaces, to large smoke-laden cities and hideous towns, badly constructed, with dense populations of workers whose lives from early childhood were committed to a bleak, monotonous and devastating round of discipline and exhausting toil.

This was the first phase in the application of the physiocratic naturalism to industrial economy in Britain. It was the new age of science and invention when economic forces were liberated, and the gospel of work was preached in order to save the souls of the masses of the people.

This development, however, must not be wholly attributed either to the Puritans or to the normal working of the free-trade principle. It was not the fault of the advocates of free trade that the industrialists in amassing wealth overlooked the human claims of the workers, but that they, in fact, did so has brought about a complete reversion of the freedom which Adam Smith advocated so enthusiastically. In self-defence workers have had to unite against employers and employers against workers, so that instead of freedom there is compulsion on all sides.

But the spirit of Adam Smith's teaching was sound, and it is that spirit which must be rediscovered and which will give new life to languishing industry, not in Britain only, but throughout the world. For with this freedom he advocated friendliness and every effort to foster goodwill and co-operation amongst all nations in the world. Moreover, he showed that hostility and over-expenditure in preparation for war might prove ruinous to nations even

though the resulting bankruptcy could be disguised by a manipulation of the currency.

He changed the aim of the power politics of his time which regarded the whole military and economic power of the State as an end in itself. For him power was necessary for co-operation among the nations and so his aim was not offence but defence. His attitude in the whole of his work aimed at the removal of friction, and that, at a time when national antagonisms were everywhere regarded as inevitable, was a remarkable achievement.

It is therefore the spirit rather than the letter of Adam Smith's work which is of such supreme importance. To this day it is a strong rebuke both to extreme economic nationalism and to extreme economic sentimentalism. It is, moreover, a warning against an attitude of scientific rigidity which would divest man of his essential humanity, for in his view a sound system must take cognizance of both these sides and combine them. It was the complete failure to take heed of these warnings that led directly to the French Revolution, which in its immediate effects brought about a worsening of conditions for the people. Only when the Revolution receded into the distance so that its excesses could be viewed more in perspective did its ideals once again claim attention.

CHAPTER VI

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

THE French Revolution, with its splendid slogan "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," was a bomb which, by the violence of its explosion, destroyed not only the evils which it was intended to destroy but also the authors of reform, so that the French people, after the Revolution, found themselves under a despotism much more absolute than had ever been the monarchy they were so keen to overthrow. The remains of feudalism still existing in eighteenth-century France were particularly burdensome, as the aristocracy, the descendants of the feudal lords, still retained their privileges in exemption from the main part of the taxation of the country, and in services and dues which they were still entitled to exact from the peasants, whilst they no longer possessed any political power or had any duties to perform towards the peasants.

In feudal times when the *seigneurs*¹ ruled the peasants and led them to battle, the latter felt that the burdens they had to bear in taxation and forced labour were in return for the protection afforded by their overlord from the enemy, and also for his patriarchal care in times of dearth, which was of frequent occurrence, particularly before the cultivation of the potato. Indeed, the exemption from taxation enjoyed by the aristocracy was due to the fact that the *taille* originally was a seignorial tax which the peasant paid to his overlord in return for protection. Thus there was between the lord and peasant a bond of mutual usefulness which gave a *raison d'être* to their conditions and circumstances.

In the seventeenth century, however, under Louis XIII the power of the lords was curtailed, as the sovereign feared

¹ *Seigneurs* : lords, nobility.

it, and Louis XIV, who had no fear of the lords, yet from vanity and a desire to see his lords around him at court adding to its splendour, still further reduced their power. Government had become more and more centralized in the sovereign and his appointed officials, so that Paris was the centre of all life and movement. The nobles therefore who could afford it lived in Paris at the Court, whilst their estates were administered by agents. The government officials were intentionally chosen from the lower orders, to such an extent indeed that the lords would have considered it quite beneath their dignity to hold any official position. We have, therefore, the spectacle in the eighteenth century of an aristocracy completely isolated from all government and administration, apart from certain few districts such as Vendée and Languedoc, which, being far away from Paris, still retained a united interest between lords and peasants.

Throughout almost the entire country the rural districts were inhabited only by peasants, being deserted even by the more prosperous middle classes, who, as soon as their means afforded it, bought an official position carrying with it immunity from the *taille* or property tax, and forthwith migrated into the towns. Freedom from taxation, indeed, which originally referred only to the nobility and clergy, as time went on became more and more extensive, for not only did the offices embracing this privilege amount to thousands, but even certain important provinces, particularly those recently united to the French Crown, were exempt. The weight of taxation, therefore, was absolutely crushing for those who were not privileged, and particularly in the country districts, for in the towns there were means of alleviating the burden.

The country districts were thus sunk in poverty, ignorance and apathy, and agriculture suffered a serious decline, while in many districts the population showed a decrease owing to the frequent occurrence of famine and disease. So low was the general level of intelligence in these districts that they were dependent on the opinion of Paris for their attitude to all general matters, and all their affairs, even purely local matters such as ordinary repairs to the parish

church, had for so long been controlled from Paris, with the inevitable accumulation of business and consequent delay in settlement, that the people had a very bad example of tardy accomplishment set them by the State. Thus, whilst the population of Paris was rapidly increasing because of its importance as the capital of this highly centralized country, and because of the influx of workers, who in their native districts were hampered by the proscriptions of the trade guilds, the rural districts were depopulated and conditions for those who remained were so bad that one can truly say that the peasant's position was in some ways worse at the beginning of the eighteenth century than it had been in the thirteenth, while that of the small proprietor was burdened beyond endurance.

There was thus throughout the country an ever-increasing discontent with conditions, for the tremendous financial burden, due to the luxury of the Court of Marie Antoinette,¹ but much more inherited from the numerous ruinous wars of Louis XIV and the shameless orgies of Louis XV, fell most heavily on the poorest classes. With a lack of justice that seems incredible, even in the case of such taxes as did fall upon the privileged classes together with the commoners, it was the rich who could most easily evade them, leaving their share as an added burden for the poor to discharge.

And yet by the middle of the eighteenth century there was a growing sympathy with the poorer classes, which was expressed in the lighter sentences imposed by the law courts and also in the writings of the philosophers. But although the penalties imposed were so much less severe than formerly, yet the letter of the law remained unchanged, the written code being left as harsh and cruel as before. It was as if the lower orders had their abject condition laid bare to them and were enlightened as to the claims of humanity, without obtaining any real improvement. It seemed indeed as if the philosophers delighted in showing up the iniquitous conditions of the Third Estate, and even the ill-fated Louis XVI himself frequently referred to these, and

¹ Marie Antoinette, Archduchess of Austria, at age of fourteen married the Dauphin of France, who later became Louis XVI. She was guillotined in 1793.

yet no effective means were taken to alter them. The aristocracy, too, in their lack of any serious occupation delighted in the intellectual study of social conditions and applauded the philosophers who, being without any practical experience of government, pushed their various theories of possible Utopias to their logical conclusion. Then when at last in 1789 the lower orders, penetrated by the feeling of the injustice they suffered, rose in rebellion in Paris, the provinces followed their lead, the centralized government providing an organization that could speedily be utilized, and only in the province of Vendée, where the nobles remained on their estates and were in personal contact with the peasants, was any effective royalist rising made.

Louis XVI paid the penalty of the accumulated misgovernment of his predecessors, particularly Louis XIV and Louis XV. Himself possessed of all the private virtues, he lacked the power to govern, and his extravagant wife, Marie Antoinette, conscious of greater strength of character than he, proved a bad counsellor, particularly in her advice to dismiss Turgot, Louis' Minister of Finance. With Turgot's dismissal, after only twenty months of office, Louis missed his last chance of re-establishing the Government by regulating the finances and compelling the privileged classes to share in the burdens of taxation. For their exemption from taxation was indeed the main cause, among many, of the discontent seething in the middle and lower classes. The barrier separating the nobility in France from the other classes, was always fixed and visible, and each year was brought anew into prominence with the assessing and the collecting of the taxes. Every year each one of the privileged classes felt a present and urgent interest in not letting himself be confused with the masses and made a new effort to separate himself from them. Thus they had no desire and no occasion of acting together, and indeed the "third estate," the commoners, felt a still greater hatred of the newly created nobles than of the old-established aristocracy.

Never had nobility been easier to acquire than in 1789, and never had the middle classes and the nobles been more separate from each other. Yet the middle classes of France

were the most intelligent in Europe, and if they had been allowed to develop freely, would have brought great prosperity to their country. But the elaborate system of State interference, the spasmodic encouragement and checking of trade, the burdensome internal customs dues were so many hindrances to free development. The absolute power of the Sovereign subjected the country to sudden ill-considered changes which were of far-reaching effect. Louis XIV in 1685, by his Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, sent into exile thousands of Protestant textile workers, thus ruining the French silk industry, and on the eve of the Revolution of 1789, Louis XVI, though realizing that Turgot was the one man capable of settling the country's finances, yet was willing to dismiss him, because the Queen disliked him and because he would not to go to Mass.

With his dismissal vanished the liberal views of equalization of burdens and free exchange throughout the country which would have averted the impending disaster. The Court rejoiced in its freedom from the restricting economy of Turgot, never dreaming that its period of heightened extravagance was to be of such short duration and was to come to so tragic a close.

Under Turgot's successor the condition of the national finances became so desperate that the Genevan banker Necker was called in. The latter was antagonistic to Turgot's free-trade policy but through his business experience was in process of introducing some order into the taxation system, when the American War of Independence, proving irresistible to the French nation, they, in a wild mood of jealousy, revenge and enthusiasm, championed the cause of the American Colonies against England. The moral prestige of France was thereby much enhanced but the additional financial strain only served to aggravate the evils at home, while, too, the ideals of liberty and equality gained a strong hold on the imagination of the people, the French champions of the American cause having returned home before the difficulties were encountered of putting them into effect, difficulties that were bound to be much greater in an old country like France.

The States-General, summoned at last by the imperative demand of public opinion, met in May 1789 for the first time since 1614, and the people, in a state of feverish excitement, awaited the inauguration of a new era of freedom, justice and prosperity. An end was speedily made of the Old Order by the abolition of existing privileges, the King giving his consent. The Assembly then proceeded to the task of providing a new constitution, basing it on Rousseau's Declaration of the Rights of Man, and declaring that all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, but discarding the limitations recognized by Rousseau, in whose view the good State was based not on force nor on greed, but on the virtuous will of all its members. The King thus lost all authority, though he was retained as executive head of the State, and he, surrounded as he was by implacable enemies of liberal ideas, particularly the Queen and his younger brother, vacillated between acquiescence in the progressive demands of the people and resistance to them.

The one leader of the people, Mirabeau, who might have managed to advise the King and so might have reconciled him with the opposing forces, had died in April 1791, and as the Assemblies of the States-General succeeded each other, each one being fiercer in temper than the preceding, the breach between the King and themselves widened. The National Convention, which was elected by universal suffrage in September 1792, proclaimed the Republic and some months later condemned to death Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. To the enemies of the Revolution, Austria and Prussia, who were already at war with the Revolutionaries, were now added England, Holland, Spain and the German States, and there were risings in France itself in the South and in Vendée.

Against so many enemies France, after initial defeats, eventually proved successful, and after fourteen months of a reign of terror led by Marat, Danton and Robespierre, who in turn suffered the same end as their victims, Napoleon Bonaparte emerged, first as a military leader of genius and then as an equally able law-giver and administrator. Had he been content to rule France for the good of the country

and not for personal ambition the subsequent history of Europe might have been very different, for he gave France a legal code which is still in existence to-day and traces of which are still found in all the countries he subdued, but in his pride of conquest he was no better than Louis XIV and his wars bled France just as had those of the "Roi Soleil,"¹ and the fear and hatred roused in the neighbouring monarchical states bound upon France, when finally he was overthrown, a Bourbon rule once more which was under obligation not to admit any liberal ideas of government, so that the battle of Waterloo in 1815 sounded the defeat of government by the people and the reconstitution throughout Europe of a despotism more severe than had been that existing in France in 1789, while the terrible example of the French Revolution discouraged in the neighbouring countries too those who might have championed the cause of the people in their claims for political and economic justice.

In Britain the effect of the French Revolution was to strengthen enormously the cause of the forces of reaction. The governing class had lived for a generation in constant fear of a violent revolution. Tom Paine and William Godwin were the two chief exponents of the French Revolution ideals and had been stirring up the minds of the people and showing them that the first principles of the Revolution were in the main an appeal to human reason. Edmund Burke, though in favour of the American Revolution, refused to accept the liberal views of the French Revolution thinkers as being a proper basis for politics. He argued, on the other hand, the fundamental importance of a living tradition in political life which could only be made real in the accumulated experience of a hereditary governing class. His speeches and lectures carried immense weight with the rulers of the country and in consequence strong measures of repression were taken against every form of radical activity.

It was not, however, mainly because of these repressive measures that Britain did not follow France's revolutionary

¹ "Roi Soleil," Sun King, name by which Louis XIV was known.

example in 1789. The two Constitutions were fundamentally different. France was an absolute monarchy with an aristocracy enjoying great privileges without political power. The aristocracy was exclusive in the respect that it did not admit into its ranks men who had made fortunes in commerce and industry. Moreover, it was free from taxation which had become heavy owing to France's military expenditure in order to maintain her power and prestige, consequently the ruling class found itself opposed both by the commercial classes and the starving peasants in a revolution that shook all Europe to its foundations.

In Britain the aristocracy possessed political power as well as privilege—indeed at that time they were the only people who did possess political power—and they were wise enough neither to exempt themselves from taxation nor to prevent new men from entering their ranks. All through the eighteenth century the landed class steadily recruited adherents from the industrial and commercial classes both by direct admission and intermarriage, whilst the system of rotten boroughs enabled the man with the longest purse to get into Parliament. Thus there was no such concentration of all the forces against the Government in Britain as there was in France. Britain gradually moved from parliamentary aristocracy to parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth century. The Reform Act took the place of a revolution, and from then it was apparent that Britain was moving towards parliamentary democracy based on universal suffrage. The working-classes, however, had to wait until 1864 and 1884 before they got the vote and the women until 1918, and by the latter date parliamentary democracy was itself being challenged by other forms of government.

In Germany at this period, when her literature was, for the first time in history, foremost in Europe, only Herder was sympathetic towards the French Revolution and realized the importance of its intellectual and political innovations. Even Schiller, the poet of liberty, saw only its excesses. Political thought in Germany was moving along different lines ; it was moving towards nationalism and the power of the State, and the dominant school was

Hegelian. Hegel derived his philosophy of nationalism and the power of the State from Kant, and curiously enough Kant had taken it from Rousseau. Moreover, as we shall see later, the economic position of Germany never allowed her people to have any sympathy with either the ethics or the economics of Liberalism which emanated from the French Revolution.

CHAPTER VII

HEGEL AND MARX

THE ideals of Rousseau which had given such a strong impetus to the French Revolution were now to undergo a complete change in the hands of Hegel. In Hegel's view Rousseau's doctrine of The General Will did not lead to collectivism ; on the contrary, it glorified the State and it bade the individual seek to realize himself not in his own private concerns alone or nearly so much as in and through his contribution to the State. The State was, therefore, in Hegel's view, a mystical being ; it was an end in itself to which the separate individuals within it at any particular time must give themselves whole-heartedly, as only in this way could they express their highest personality.

Hegel is thus the philosopher of the modern Fascist state whilst Marx, as we shall see later, by turning Hegel's philosophy "right side up," to use his own words, became the philosopher of Communism. It will therefore be necessary for our purpose to examine briefly some of the ideas of Hegel and Marx.

Hegel set out by defining the Absolute. To him the Absolute was something not unknowable. It was a combination of mind and matter. Mind and matter, he declared, are not separate realities but are integral components of one process of self-revelation of the Absolute. This was an attempt to put a bridge between the abstract and the concrete. Hegel argued that mind requires an objective world upon which to project itself, but this objective world is in itself mental ; in other words the real is rational and the rational is real. His method of developing his theory was by means of dialectic. Thus a thought occurs (thesis) ;

it is opposed by another thought (anti-thesis) ; neither of the thoughts are adequate and a third (synthesis) harmonizes what was true in the first and second thoughts.

For Hegel the whole world was composed of such syntheses and his dialectic gave a new force to the study of history, which now came to be regarded as a divine revelation. But Hegel's philosophy lent itself to two different interpretations, with the result that the more conservative-minded people accepted the one side, that the real is rational or whatever is, is right, whilst the revolutionaries took the other view, that the rational is real or is bound to become real.

Hegel based his philosophy on the concept that Consciousness determines Being. In other words, Hegel believed that mind or the idea was transcendent to and controlled matter and the outside objective world. For Hegel, progress consisted in a gradual realization of the "idea" of which material things and conditions were but the reflection. This revolutionary element, together with the historical spirit that pervaded Hegel's philosophy, made it very acceptable to the nineteenth-century thinkers, as it was in contrast to the great rigidity and fixedness that characterized and determined the main outlook of the eighteenth century.

Closely linked to his philosophy was his political theory which he developed in his *Outlines of Philosophy*. Here he set out to show the purely intellectual modes and processes through which the idea of the State must take shape. For his starting-point he took the Will, but the Will, as Hegel conceived it, was not an attribute of an individual person as was the case with Rousseau. He contended that Rousseau had gone wrong here and that the Will should be considered as an aspect of pure abstract intelligence. Thus conceived, the Will is external, universal and self-determining and freedom is the essence of its expression, or, to put the matter in Hegel's own words, "The idea of the Will as a last abstraction is the free will that wills the free will."

Hegel regards the State as based (a) upon the family, and (b) upon the whole complex of relationships which grow up

among men and give rise to many different forms of social, political and economic organization, which he calls Civil Society. Hegel's Civil Society is what most people call the State ; it develops out of the economic relations among men and the legal conditions which arise out of these relations. The Civil Society gives rise to classes corresponding to the economic relations which exist within it. These classes or " estates " are the second basis of the community, the family being always the first. Hegel's classes are the agricultural or peasant, the industrial, and the universal or governing class. The industrial class he subdivides into artisans, commercial men and manufacturers, a class which he thinks is inclined to freedom through the nature of its work, whilst on the other hand, the agricultural class is inclined to subjection, also because of the nature of its work. The governing class has the power to embody in itself the qualities that are necessary to unite society and form the State.

It will be observed that Hegel thinks of the industrial class as having a freedom arising out of the nature of its work, and he speaks of this as the natural home of corporate society. In other words, he is thinking of a society of employers and employed, bound together for the purpose of freeing themselves from the restrictions of feudalism. There is no mention of a class struggle ; this comes later in Marx. Hegel is merely seeking to create a unity which will give both employers and employed a due place in his Civil Society. This is the idea behind Fascism and the Corporative State.

The State remains absolutely sovereign and only recognizes the corporations as necessary instruments of its own supremacy ; the corporative system arises through the validity of functional estates and not, as in the case of Marx, through the class struggle. In Hegel and in modern Fascism the stress is laid on universality and the actual unity achieved under the State. In short, Hegel's theory of the State is an endeavour to exhibit society as an expression of the Absolute. He thinks of the State as a working model of the " idea " which is the reality behind phenomena. For the

thoroughgoing idealist in the Hegelian sense, the conscious beings who live under the shadow of the Absolute have just as much or as little title to independent consideration as the cells of the human body. He says, "The State is an end in itself. It is the ultimate end, which has the first right against the individual, whose highest duty is to be a member of the State," and again, "The State is the divine idea as it exists on earth, for all the worth which the human being possesses and all his spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State."

Thus it will be observed that whatever may be said for Hegel's theory, it is non-ethical, for it does not seek to find reasons for human conduct in any ultimate end of human action or in any rational principle of human duty. Nor is it scientific. It simply assumes certain conceptions and dogmatically expounds them in very general terms, thus leaving no room for an appeal to experience. If societies differ from the idealistic conception of them, so much the worse for those societies. Moreover, Hegel claims that an individual is necessary, preferably a king or a monarch, to express the will and to realize the personality of the State. Between the monarch and the people he puts a series of estates or corporations, not as an expression of the people's rights, nor even as a check on absolutism, but simply in order to let the people know that they are being well governed. Hence the Fascist notion of the Corporative State.

Further, Hegel makes what he calls "freedom" the starting-point of his theory of the State, but his "freedom" is merely conformity to the dictates of the State itself, and this "freedom" needs to be conditioned by law and custom and expressed by the will of the State. He says that it is the highest duty of an individual to be a faithful member of the State, for beyond the State there is no higher association, and States have no duties to one another or to humanity. Thus Hegel recognizes no internationalism, and here again his doctrine bears a singular resemblance to modern Fascism and the methods of the dictators.

The final channel through which the State is revealed as

perfected free will is world history. Hegel believed that the process of events in history is an unfolding of the universal spirit ; that the culture of all people whether in religion, philosophy, economics or art expresses a particular phase in the revelation and activity of the absolute idea, the process of the revelation and activity of the idea being a fourfold dialectic. There are the four great world-historical political systems in which the idea of freedom has progressed to complete and perfect realization. These four systems are : the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman and the German, all of which, by fitting the facts of history into the logic of Hegel are shown to reveal mankind marching through the ages, steadily but unconsciously towards the Germanic perfection, where the modern world freedom is revealed to be the universal principle of the State life. " The Orient knew and to the present day knows only that *One* (the despot) is free ; the Greek and Roman world that *Some* are free ; the German world knows that *All* are free." Such is Hegel's generalization of the world-historical process.

This is a view based upon the metaphysical nature of the State and postulating a teleological idea which is working itself out in the process of history. The universe is so harmonized that the idea can work itself to perfection through the dialectic. This harmony is not something which is achieved through the smooth running of the mechanism of the universe, as the mechanistic philosophers would say, or through economic changes that take place from time to time, as the Marxians would say ; it exists because of the very nature of reason itself. To Hegel the whole rational world is a medium for the self-realization of the rational idea. In his view it is this that gives sense and order to the universe.

Hegel's professorial work at Jena, Heidelberg, and finally at Berlin, made a strong impression, and though he had already been dead several years when Karl Marx went as a student to Berlin University, his influence was still strongly felt there and Marx eagerly imbibed his teaching. Later, however, Marx gave an unexpected turn to the Hegelian philosophy of history.

Hegel, as we have seen, based his philosophy upon the "Idea". He said that "Consciousness determined Being" or, in other words, progress consisted in the gradual realization of the "Idea" of which material things and conditions were but the reflection. Marx, while accepting Hegel's dialectic, contradicted his starting-point that Consciousness determined Being, arguing that Hegel's dialectic led to idealism and that this was philosophy standing on its head. He therefore turned it upside down and said that "Being determined Consciousness"; that is to say that Marx regarded the "Idea" or ideas in men's minds as a reflection of their experience of the external world. This is Dialectical Materialism or, in other words, Marx's materialism was an answer to what he considered to be Hegel's idealism and from it we get what Marx called his Materialist Conception of History.

Dialectical Materialism is neither the most attractive nor is it the easiest of philosophies to understand, but that it has many points of truth no one can seriously doubt. If it claims that the historical process leads towards freedom and that freedom can be equated with the classless society, it is merely echoing the Christian ethic and ideal, but of course the Christian can never accept the fundamental materialism. The Christian believes that a Materialist Conception of History would be compelled to discard all morality. If, for God, there was substituted the whole historical process, then obviously impersonality would reign supreme and a strictly impersonal process is unmoral, so that neither praise nor blame could be attached to it; an unmoral system made up of the lives and character of human beings is an anachronism.

It is important, however, that we should be quite clear as to what Marx really meant by his Materialism. Marx's materialism was very different from the mechanistic materialism of the scientific school. He had nothing in common with the views of the physicists following on Bacon and Descartes who thought of the universe in terms of a machine—a mechanical universe that somehow had been wound up and was now running down without a

personal God in control. This was the materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was still a strong force in Marx's time in the nineteenth century. Nor did he seem to have anything in common with the contemporary geological and biological school of Lyell, Darwin and Spencer. Neither Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, Darwin's *Descent of Man* nor Spencer's general theory of evolution seem to have influenced him very much, though the latter was the predominant school of materialism during the nineteenth century and attracted far more adherents than ever the mechanistic school had done.

Marx's materialism was based simply upon "the powers of production," but the powers of production mean nothing except in relation to man's knowledge of their use. Coal, for example, is a power of production, but it is so only when men have learned how to mine it. It therefore becomes a question whether the powers of production in this sense can rightly be called material or whether a theory based upon the predominance of these powers of production in the general scheme of things can rightly be called materialism. It is perfectly true that Marx called himself a materialist, but the question is, was he right in so doing? The real test of materialism is when mind is contraposed to matter and the latter is regarded as transcendent. Marx, in fact, never contraposed mind to matter. On the contrary, for him mind is ranged behind and on the side of the economic and productive forces against the more abstract conception of the Hegelian Idea. The coal in the bowels of the earth is not really a power of production until the mind of man has learned how to dig it and bring it to the surface and use it. If, of course, on the other hand, we mean by materialism a disbelief in the Supernatural or the Divine ordering of the world then Marx was a materialist and what he did was to turn men's minds towards the view that the economic forces in the world and not the physical or biological are transcendent.

For Marx it was the powers of production in their ceaseless development, together with man's knowledge of how to develop and use these powers of production at every stage

in the world's history that changed the face of civilization. It was these powers of production that gave to man the different forms of economic organization, and it was economic organization mainly that determined social classes and the different distributions of power. At one time the power mainly belonged to the great landlords, and society was constructed in accordance with their needs; then came the commercial and the industrial classes, who opposed the power of the landlords. Finally, there was a fusion of the two, and a new governing class based upon this fusion was created. But in order to develop the industrial resources at the disposal of society, the new combination of industrial capitalists had to gather the workers into mills and mines, and subject them to a common discipline. The workers, according to Marx, would then combine and through combining would obtain power and ultimately overthrow the capitalist class. This Marx called the victory of the proletariat, and as there would now be no subject-class to exploit there would be the classless society.

This theory, whether we accept it as materialist or not, had powerful repercussions in the sphere of political practice. It meant that the State as a State did not exist but was merely a reflection of the dominant economic class in society, and as each new class was raised to authority it would re-make the State in its own image. According to Marx, the workers in their turn would not only use the State to gain their own ends but would destroy it altogether, and other institutions would be organized on the basis of the classless society. This is the basis of Marxian Communism and this is what Russia attempted after the Revolution of 1917.

As will be seen, then, Marx builds up a philosophy of social evolution upon the basis of economic classes. But the Marxian classes differ radically from the Hegelian. Hegel's classes were defined in accordance with their objective spheres of service. They were agricultural, industrial and governing, whereas Marx's classes were divided up in accordance with their economic status; Hegel puts all agricultural classes together, whereas Marx

divides them into feudal lords and peasants. In the same way Hegel puts capitalists and workers together in industry, whereas Marx divides the employers from the employed. Hegel's government requires a governing class in terms of the function of government. For Marx this is not necessary, as each class governs in virtue of its economic power and is therefore defined in terms of its economic status rather than its political position. Thus the Marxian or Communist structure of society is in sharp contrast to the Hegelian or Fascist form. Marx appeared to think that this economic structure of society, this economic determinism which he called the materialist conception of history, was the clue to all world history. In this he was clearly wrong. Economic determination may explain to some extent the genius of Western civilization from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present time. Indeed, since the Reformation in particular, economic forces have played a considerable part in bringing about the changes, religious, social and political, within the single civilization, but they are not the only forces, nor can they explain, at least in the Marxian sense, the changes that have been brought about by the impact of one civilization upon another, say the Western civilization upon the Eastern, or the relation of one civilization to another which has not been continuous in time.

It should be observed, moreover, that Marxism has a dual nature throughout, and is therefore much more complex than is generally supposed. Indeed, it is more a religion than a philosophy, and from this it probably derives its main strength. It is not materialism except in a limited sense ; in fact, it is a form of realism which is much nearer to idealism than to materialism. It must never be forgotten that Marx was born and trained in the German school of idealists of the early nineteenth century. His whole thought was permeated with their ideas, especially those of Hegel and Fichte, and like Feuerbach, from whom he received many of his impressions, his mind was saturated with idealist philosophy at the same time as he was calling himself a materialist.

But Marxism is not only a doctrine of historical and economic determinism concerned with the dependence of man on economics, it is also a doctrine of deliverance. Marx believed that in the course of time, and through the Messianic vocation of the proletariat, man is to be delivered from the shackles of the economic forces, and there is to be a classless society. This is the actual thesis of Marx in his economic determinism. In a capitalist society man's life is mainly determined by the forces of economics, but for Marx that is the sin of the past. He will be delivered ; he will be freed from slavery and the active body that will do this will be the proletariat. They and they alone will establish the good life. This looks very like a secularization of the old Jewish Messianic consciousness, and Marx was a Jew. The forces which will turn the world upside down have been found, and there Marx's materialism turns into extreme idealism.

But it is Marx's economic theory which has particularly impressed the world, and indeed Marx was a philosopher not in any strict sense but only to give a philosophic background to his economic theories. Marx's economic doctrines may be summed up in his theory of value, by which he tried to show how the workers are exploited by the capitalist. Historically the theory is an attempt to explain, in economic terms, the growth of movements and institutions. As we have seen, Marx insists on the antagonism of the various classes, and this he claims to be the dynamic underlying the whole historic process. For himself, and for many others, though not for all, this view results in a completely materialistic conception of history. Politically, his doctrines are a defence of revolution, and revolution is to be the method by which the workers are to obtain power, which is to be followed by a period of dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to give time to consolidate ultimately a condition of general freedom.

But Marx's theory of value is at best only a very loose interpretation of Ricardo. Ricardo maintained that the value of any commodity was measured by the amount of labour that goes to its production, but with a distinct

quality qualification. Marx ignored this important qualification and offered an essentially different theory. He declared that exchange value is not the singular quality of the commodity in which it inheres, but rather the quality which it possesses in common with all other commodities for which it can be exchanged, and since human labour is the quality which all commodities possess in common, human labour must be the measure of exchange value. It will be observed that Marx thought of human labour as being all the same ; he made no attempt to differentiate the quality. Labour was paid differently, simply in relation to the different amount of labour used up in the process of making any given commodity.

Moreover, Marx argued that wages are based on the worker's necessities of life, but the worker produces in a day more than is necessary for his life. If the worker is employed eight hours a day we may assume that he has produced enough for his necessities in six hours. In other words, the labourer has given two hours or a third of his work to the capitalist. Marx termed this extra production "surplus value," and he assumed that the capitalist, taking this surplus as his profit, robbed the worker of it. Labour is bought in a market of free competition from which it follows that only by doing away with capitalism can this exploitation of the labourer be stopped.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any great length upon the fallacies of this argument. To begin with, quality of labour is in fact a very important component in the value of any commodity. It is not only the lump of labour that counts but also the kind of labour. The demand for a commodity also determines its value, because it would be useless to produce articles that were not desired. Then, too, different qualities of articles are made which also have an effect upon their value.

Moreover, differences in wages are not merely due to the time and effort used in the process of production. It costs as much to make a bad tradesman as it does to make a good one, but the quality of a good tradesman's work has a value in what economists call quasi-rent and that

quite apart from the cost in labour effort, and this quasi-rent appears in the value-in-exchange of the product. Marx failed even to note that in any product which yields rent the measurement of value is based upon the marginal and not on the mean cost of production, with the result that he never really understood the nature of rent as propounded by Ricardo.

Again, in the Marxian analysis whatever does not appear as wages is regarded as unearned profit. This may be quite true of rent and interest values, but it is not quite fair in regard to those whose work is to direct business to say that their work does not create value and that at best it is merely a matter of "cunning." ¹

This theory is fundamentally wrong and one has to ask how it came about that Marx got such a large following for his view, especially among one class of society. It is not difficult to explain. Ricardo, as was shown in a previous chapter, was the economist of the industrialist as against the landowning class. He drew a sharp distinction between the legitimate earnings of a hard-working mill-owner and those of an absentee landlord. But Marx, as we have seen, in opposition to Hegel, did not think of associating the mill-owner with the artisan and therefore in Marx's view this distinction had no relevance. For Marx, those who lived by wages were poor; those who did not were rich. The worker himself knew he was poor, he knew also that he produced more than he could consume, and that his surplus production was divided among the rich, and often the idle rich. A theory such as Marx's naturally appealed to him, as an explanation of his depressed condition, and indeed it is likely to do so again at every turn of the trade-cycle producing economic depression, for in times of depression business men always try to balance their budgets by driving down the wage levels of the workers. The theory therefore appealed to the worker solely because it fitted into his experience and not on the merit of its economic accuracy.

But Marx was on much more solid ground when he was

¹ *Das Kapital*, Vol. III (German edition), Part I, p. 343.

dealing with the concentration of capital. Indeed, his accurate prognosis of the nature and form in which the capitalist world would develop is one of the great contributions to history. It is exact in almost every detail even to the revolution, which has taken place in Russia, though that indeed was not the country in which he expected it to happen.

And, moreover, when we consider the concentration of capital, the rise of the machine, the larger industrial unit, together with the undoubted fact that through this development many of the capitalists to-day are turned into mere financiers and are in exactly the same position as the absentee landlords of the nineteenth century, if not even worse, one wonders whether the force of the developing economic circumstances has not made the greater part of Marx's theory of value a truism which, when he wrote it, was a fallacy.

But Marx's real contribution to civilization is to be found in the fact that he was the first thinker to expose the moral and spiritual inadequacy of a purely economic or commercial civilization. He had no belief in the efficacy of laws and always sought for the spirit that lay behind them. In such an attitude there is no materialism ; it is the purest of idealism, to show as he clearly did that in any civilization where the main effort is the attainment of wealth, those spiritual and moral values which are basically noble can never acquire their full strength and vigour.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

THE terrible evils of English industrialism had been brought about by England's becoming the workshop of the world and by the rise of the machine age. As a result of the new system large numbers of people were concentrated in towns, and evil-smelling slums were allowed to grow up, in which quick fortunes were made out of an ill-paid and undernourished mass of people who had been brought from the country to the towns.

The whole system was revolting and one of its worst features was the manner in which little children were exploited. Even in 1819, when the first Factory Act was passed, it did no more than limit the hours of work of children to twelve and a half a day and prohibited the employment of children under nine in certain factories. It was against these evils that Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris were waging incessant warfare, backed by such movements as Chartism and the Trade Unions—such as these latter were at that time—and any other reform movement that could be recruited to their side.

Contemporary with these writers and reformers was the dominant school of political and economic thinkers, known as the Utilitarians. The Utilitarians believed in the greatest happiness of the greatest number; they believed in free trade and insisted on the need for keeping government interference within the narrowest possible limits. This school was founded and led by Jeremy Bentham. It included James Mill and his more illustrious son John

Stuart Mill, as well as David Ricardo, the oracle of currency and public finance in his time.

Carlyle had a rooted contempt for the Utilitarians, who he appeared to think flattered a society of self-made industrial plutocrats and plutocrats in the making. Indeed, the whole underlying philosophy of Utilitarianism, even after it had been remodelled by John Stuart Mill, was so violently attacked by him that it simply withered away, though the spirit of it remained and blossomed out again among Liberal Reformers and Fabian Socialists. It did so because in the hands of the latter it became a doctrine protesting against the consequences of *laissez-faire*, rather than as it had been formerly a doctrine supporting the idea of *laissez-faire*.

The transition took place in the long-drawn-out struggle over the Factory Acts. As the century advanced it became more obvious that the only possible way of getting rid of the worst evils of industrialism was to introduce direct State-action, a movement which, as we have seen, was strongly opposed by Bentham and the early Utilitarians. But the Fabians following in the footsteps of John Stuart Mill, who had recast the whole doctrine of Utilitarianism, began to build up their theory of State intervention. They went much farther than Mill because, as the volume of social legislation became larger, they came to regard the State not as an institution for the coercion of industrialists, but as an instrument for providing directly the supply of social services. The Fabian Society, composed of some of the ablest men in this country, did much for the working-class people at a time when conditions of work and living were at their very worst.

The Utilitarians, however, were not the only school that Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris had to contend with in the nineteenth century. They had to face up to the new school of Biologists, many of whom were in their way no less materialistic than the old mechanistic school of philosophers and scientists. It was perhaps not so much the general materialism of the new school of biology that radical thinkers like Carlyle and Ruskin objected to, for

their theory applied to life as a whole, as it was to the application of the theory to industry and the devastating effects it was having upon the life of the workers.

Competitive biological theories such as "nature red in tooth and claw" and the "survival of the fittest" when applied to industry produced an individualism of the lowest and worst possible type, the effect of which was to reduce a large section of the working people of this country to a condition such that their biological equals could not have been found outside of the savage races of the world.

Charles Darwin published his *Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection* in 1859, and this was followed some twelve years later by his sensational work, *The Descent of Man*. The Darwinian theory had an instantaneous effect upon religion, politics and economics. In the sphere of religion, for example, the spectacle of nature red in tooth and claw was immediately substituted for the book of Genesis. In politics the theory of the survival of the fittest gave impetus to the idea that only the strong should be encouraged to breed, whilst in economics, competition, backed if necessary by political and military action, was held to be the only sure foundation of progress and prosperity.

Darwin was immediately succeeded by Herbert Spencer, a Derbyshire engineer who despised Latin, Greek and Theology and thought Carlyle and Ruskin barbarous. Spencer, following Darwin, took a naturalistic view of the Universe and wrote books and papers on the evolution of man, the evolution of society and the evolution of social and religious institutions; politics and ethics were for him part of the physiology of life, his whole thought being expressed in terms of evolutionary naturalism. He was probably the greatest individualist of them all.

Spencer had a large following, not only in Britain but in Europe, as many people were attracted by this robust working-man philosopher who, although not acceptable to the professional school, had yet given them such a practical and easily understood theory of life. His following, however, was confined to the middle classes, mainly

the industrial classes, who doubtless found the theories of the survival of the fittest and nature red in tooth and claw much more in keeping than any higher philosophy could be with the horrible conditions that the rise of industrialism was imposing upon the working people.

In fact, the whole of the theories, Utilitarian, Darwinian and Spencerian, were alike highly individualist and strongly opposed to any State interference in economics and industry, and in those days in particular the middle classes were ready to follow almost any thinker who, far from having a single good word to say for Socialism or public enterprise, was opposed to any interference whatsoever from the State. The whole philosophy of Benthamite Liberalism had been derived from an earlier period in which a distinct school of thought had imposed their views on a distinct political environment. In the eighteenth century, the age of enlightenment, liberal ideas had taken precedence over the supernatural forces in every sphere of human life. Great astronomers had proved that the celestial bodies move in accordance with well-defined natural laws, and this was erroneously taken to apply universally not only in the sphere of physics, but also in the realms of politics and economics. Just as natural laws controlled the celestial bodies, so, it was contended, the instinct of self-preservation governed the acts of men. Pursuing their own interests men would create a new order from which would come a maximum of prosperity, and in Bentham's view would give the greatest happiness to the greatest number. *Laissez-faire* was proclaimed as the rule of the State ; in other words, the less interference from the State the better for all concerned. Individual freedom and mobility in production were carried forward and the French Revolution brought about the desired end.

Philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, economists like Adam Smith and Ricardo, and natural scientists like Darwin and Spencer, each in their various ways, did a great deal to encourage and develop the philosophy of Liberalism. In fact, Liberalism dominated men's minds from the middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the

nineteenth century, and even until the end of the nineteenth century its influence was far-reaching.

In Germany the philosophy of Liberalism was never well received owing mainly to the economic and industrial position of the country. Germany was late in becoming industrialized, although when it did take place the process was very rapid, and she had to adopt a policy of protection in order to safeguard her young industries against the competition of the older industrial countries, especially Britain. Again, the theory of *laissez-faire* seemed contradictory to many Germans, who, regarding the community as the essential factor, felt that it might be endangered if every individual member was absorbed in himself with no responsibility to the whole. Moreover, in Germany the conception of State interference and State monopoly came into being at a very early time, and this attitude remained so strong, even in later days, that the influence of the classical school was only temporary. German economic policy was based upon Mercantilism, and although Mercantilism was general throughout Europe, at one period the system was modified in different countries, according to the nature of the economic conditions within the particular country. In Germany, Mercantilism was a creation of the State and as much economic as political. From the very earliest days in Brandenburg Prussia, it was imposed by the State, and in fact has supplied the main driving-force of the Prussian-German policy.

Mercantilism was the keynote of Prussian-German economic policy, and whilst Britain moved away from it in the eighteenth century in a steady development towards economic Liberalism, Germany's Mercantilism developed into State Socialism. German philosophers and economists were never at one with English Liberalism, and even staunch anti-Socialists in Germany took a strong dose of State-Socialism for granted. Free-trade, generally accepted in Germany as an ideal starting-point theoretically, was never accepted as practical policy in economic activity. In this the British and German schools were never at one, and further, Germany manifested her opposition to Liber-

alism, not only in her attitude to free-trade, but also and more particularly in her antagonism to the ideal of freedom in national life. This old argument reflects the mind of the two nations, and once again the question is predominant and acute.

But in Britain itself towards the middle of the nineteenth century there appeared a number of religious-minded working men, a band of men penetrated by evangelical feeling and sympathy for the conditions that Individual Liberalism was imposing upon the workers. These men were led first of all by Alexander Macdonald, the first miners' member of Parliament, by Martin Jude, and later by Keir Hardie. Hardie was the man who clarified and crystallized the whole movement. Influenced by the robust teaching of Carlyle against Benthamism, the logic of Ruskin and the broad Christianity of the message preached by the Rev. Dr. Chalmers in Scotland, he set out to give a more practical turn to Christianity. Miner, preacher, poet and trade-unionist, he did much for the working classes, especially the miners. For the atheistic attitude which he found to be prevalent among Socialists, particularly in Germany, he had no sympathy, being himself of a deeply religious outlook. The work with him partook of the nature of a religious crusade. He was the founder of the Independent Labour Party, out of which at a later period grew the Labour Party. Hardie and his colleagues based their economic theories upon their religion, thus giving a new and more spiritual turn to British democracy. They were not only preachers of the Gospel as well as leaders in the rising trade-union movement, but they were "believers," converted men as well as industrial realists who were deeply concerned not only for the religious but also for the physical and economic welfare of the workers. They knew, moreover, the exact conditions in which the workers lived and laboured, and they could appeal to them in language that they understood.

They rejected materialism both physical and biological because their beliefs had been founded on the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the sovereignty of God. Hardie speaks

himself of most of his ideas as being taken from the Bible, and the same may be said generally of all the others. Marx, too, was rejected mainly for his economic determinism but also on account of his bad psychology. They knew, as Marx did not—and it was vital to the whole situation—that every year in this country large numbers of men were being transferred from one class to another. How often had they seen the workman of yesterday holding to-day the position of manager and in his new position being much more jealous for the rights of Capitalism and much harsher towards his fellow-workers than the master himself could ever have been! Marx, on the contrary, seemed to think of classes in watertight compartments, whereas their experience showed them this was by no means the case, at least in Britain.

These men did a great deal not only for the uplift of the working-classes of this country, but also for the strengthening of the democratic ideal in its best and noblest form. Their coming too sounded the death-knell of Benthamite Liberalism in England, for the latter had never evolved an industrial philosophy that was suitable to the needs of the workers, though it had served admirably the needs of the manufacturers and professional classes who were enfranchised in 1832. The freedom that Liberalism gave to the latter in the religious, political and economic spheres meant for them great progress, but it failed to understand the fact of trade-unionism or its underlying philosophy.

Alexander Macdonald and Keir Hardie, on the other hand, basing their ideas upon the Christian concept, showed that a political system that is to be effective must have a place in the State for the working man, to whom freedom in the economic and industrial sphere, in the fullest implication, is as necessary as freedom in the sphere of religion or politics, and if the movement for whose inauguration they were responsible has failed to attain this object and has become as monotonous and mechanical as any political movement in the past, the fault cannot be attributed to them, for in their time it was a distinctly spiritual movement, based upon the value of the individual personality.

But Britain was not the only country which experienced the effects of a bad industrialism. Germany was no better in that respect in the nineteenth century, for, though she was slower to advance towards Capitalism and Industrialism than Great Britain, yet by the seventies and eighties of last century the miners and factory workers there were experiencing conditions of living and work which were certainly not any better than those that prevailed in England at the same time.

This however only gave Germany's great man, Bismarck, his chance. Bismarck was far too able not to realize that if the Constitution of Germany was to stand the strain that would be imposed upon it, it must give better conditions of employment in order to have a contented working-class. He was not a Utilitarian and did not trust the unbridled forces of competition to create the greatest happiness of the greatest number. No! He created the German Insurance Acts which stand out as a clear landmark in the political and economic history of the world and upon which was based at a much later period the British system of workmen's insurance.

Bismarck became the "Iron Chancellor" of Germany, and perhaps he, more than any other single man, shaped the future destiny of his country. He was always bitterly opposed to France and never thought of her other than as a dangerous enemy always to be suspected. For Germany he was a Monarchist but for France he was a Republican, republicanism in his view being the weakest of all forms of government.

Bismarck's chief concern was for the national unity of Germany, which he thought would be achieved through the might of Prussia. From the beginning of his career this was the great object which he sought to achieve and which he finally accomplished. In so doing he forged the new Germany on the anvil of militarism and concentrated industrialism, with a people trained and disciplined as no others were. Germany at this period was a military oligarchy, and it was this Germany that launched the Great War of 1914.

CHAPTER IX

DEMOCRACY

THE Great War broke the continuity of Western civilization, religious, political and economic. Prior to the war the ideal of democracy as a form of government was at high-water mark, so that neither its claims nor its perils received much consideration. It was, indeed, very generally believed that all nations, as they advanced, would turn to this highest and best of all forms of government, and until 1914 this was in fact what was taking place. Even advancing Eastern nations like Japan had been copying Western methods from the middle of last century.

However, we have lived to see a change in outlook in many quarters. The Great War was hardly what men envisaged as part of an automatic progress towards the ultimate perfectibility of man, though for many the battle was fought mainly for a great ideal of which the democratic idea formed no small part. But it was a complete failure and for better or worse to-day even in France and Britain—the two countries which gave birth to the democratic idea—it has weakened, whilst in Germany and Italy every vestige of it has gone. In Russia they have established the Socialized Republic, for which in other countries democracy was merely the preparation.

This change of attitude towards democracy is due partly to a changed idea of what States ought to be and do. The growth in the scale of economic enterprise, together with the development of economic imperialism and the demand of the workers for better wages and a fairer share in the distribution of wealth, have altered radically the course of the modern state in both home and international affairs.

As was pointed out at the beginning, the world is now practically an economic unit. Banking to-day is international ; markets in foreign countries are required by all leading States, each State or government requiring to be more active than before in formulating plans and pursuing policies in order to safeguard the interests of its nationals. The result of this has shown that the checks and balances of the old parliamentary system are not only out of date, but often act as a crippling restraint on swift and decisive action. But this is not the main reason for the rapid decay of parliamentary institutions. For example, in Great Britain during the Victorian era, there were two great parties in the State, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The difference of policy separating these parties, while in the main quite clear, was relatively small. They aimed at no fundamental alteration in the structure of society ; their differences were largely those affecting the direction of economic policy. In the United States the dividing line between the two great parties was even less clear, but here too there was no group or party trying to alter the structure of the State in any absolute way. Socialism existed as a theory but not as a party, and there was no challenge to the established order.

But by the beginning of the Great War the movement towards Socialism was being directed towards altering the structure of the State, and by the end of the war it was intensified in every leading country in the world except the United States of America. This was due partly to the rise of the working-classes and partly to the political and economic conditions that prevailed immediately after the Great War. Russia had her Revolution in 1917 before the war finished. She had set up in embryo a Communist State based upon the Marxian ideology and, shortly after the war, she began to make her influence felt in some of the leading countries of the world at a time when these countries were trying to rebuild their Constitutions on the basis of democracy. The fundamental principles upon which the Constitutions were based were constantly challenged by Lenin who, by this time, had become the Dictator

of the Russian Proletariat. The policy of the new Communist Dictatorship appeared to be, "Go ye out into all the world and preach the gospel of Communism." This was not only fatal to the revival of real democracy but it played a considerable part in creating the atmosphere for the setting up of the rival philosophy of Fascism in Italy and Germany, which, acting like a boomerang upon Russia herself, caused her to retreat finally to her own country to build up her internal armaments in order to safeguard herself from those countries whose Fascist institutions she unwittingly had done so much to create.

But the problem of democracy in the world is a much wider one and must be examined in two fundamental aspects in order to obtain any realistic conception of what its function and effects have been. Democracy is first and foremost a religio-political doctrine, but it is also and almost equally an economic one. We must therefore consider these two sides, because from both of them it has been assailed. Russia and Germany have attacked it on all fronts, religious, political and economic alike, though not in quite the same way, whilst Italy has refrained so far at least from any attack on religion.

We need not waste any time in considering how far democracy is a product of the French Revolution or the Industrial Revolution or anything else. That is unimportant for our purpose, but we must consider upon what claims it was based, both from the religio-political side and from the economic. We shall therefore begin by a study of the religio-political implications of democracy and pass on to the economic.

The democratic ideal in its origin is not a distinctly Christian product, though Christianity has probably been the most potent single force in developing it, and it is so congruous with the spirit of Christ that it is impossible for Christians not to sympathize with its political and economic aims. For instance, democracy postulates a great faith—faith in the capacity of ordinary men and women, and faith in the power of spiritual ideals. Both these claims are worthy of the greatest respect, because both seek to enthrone

the spiritual personality of man and to establish a belief in the power of spiritual ideals—ideals of justice and service—not because they are seen to have any conspicuous or immediate success, but because when they are viewed across long stretches of history it is manifest that they do conquer.

But the early enthusiasts for democracy based it upon two very different claims, neither of which can be substantiated. One was that there resides by right in the People an inherent sovereignty and the other that the People is always right.

These views were put into effect in the French Revolution with the result that the administration of the most horrible privations and punishments seemed to assume a new moral character when it could be said that they were inflicted by the People or in the name of the People. It is true that the French Revolution contributed to the idea of democracy by liberating the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, but it is equally true that it also indulged in the most heinous and horrible atrocities of which the modern world has any record. The most ghastly crimes against humanity were declared justified in the name of the People, in other words a moral justification of crime was made in the sovereign name of the People of France.

Plainly the People have no right to such sovereignty. Inherent sovereignty of this kind is a moral attribute which belongs only to God, who is the personification of the Moral Law. To give sovereign right to the People is wrong, and only to God and the Right can there be any fundamentally sound allegiance. It is not denied that democracy is beyond all doubt the best form of government, but it is also the most dangerous and, in practice, it can easily become the worst. There, in a word, is its virtue and its vice, and whether it is a virtue or a vice depends no less upon the nature of its claims than upon the form of its administration, not only in the realms of religio-politics but also in the sphere of economics. It will not of course in practice become definitely or literally the one or the other, but the forces within it must work in such harmony

and be so fair, not only to the people within any national bounds but also to the whole world outside, that it can be regarded, at least on balance, as being a system of virtue. That is the acid test of democracy.

France and Britain are democracies—at least so we believe—they won the war, but does any one now consider that they acted quite fairly to Germany in the years immediately after the war? The “hang the Kaiser” policy was a policy dictated by the People and not by the leaders, as indeed was the whole spirit behind the Versailles Treaty. Democracy may be capable of becoming the best form of government, but this will not be achieved as the result of the People’s determination being considered to be always right—if indeed it can be defined who the People are. The mob who carried out the French Revolution atrocities were a fair proportion of the People, and no one to-day in his or her senses would attempt to justify such actions.

Moreover, the People seldom have a single mind, and democratic rule is therefore by majorities; the majority, it is believed, will reflect the right rather than the wrong. This, as everyone knows, does not follow in the least; in fact, the majority is much more likely to be wrong than is a small minority, and particularly so in making a decision on a difficult question. Again, democracy works by the enactment of laws, just the same as in any other system, and it may be said that the majority is much more likely than the minority to reflect public opinion, and therefore is much more likely to obtain obedience to the enactment of the Law. This is true, and it is one of the cardinal virtues of the majority idea, though it is not true to say that obedience is due only to those laws in regard to which the People have been either directly or indirectly consulted. The real basis of sound democracy is the recognition that man’s obedience is due primarily to God and the Right, and only secondarily to the Law, and that too only in so far as the latter is an embodiment of Right and a bond on public order upon which depends as a general rule the welfare of all the people. Law, however august

and overwhelming to the individual, and however necessary in any state whether Democratic or Fascist, is not and ought not to be regarded as an ultimate tribunal. This is the rock on which the ship of democracy is foundering and upon which it will perish ultimately unless it avoids the dangerous currents. As man's ultimate obedience in Fascism is to the State and not to law, so in Democracy man's ultimate obedience should be to God and not to law. A Democracy which gives its highest obedience to law is worse than a Hegelian state which commands implicit obedience to the State.

It will be observed then that three very common defences of democracy have been rejected on the ground that these are not ideals which should be accepted and which, if they are accepted, cannot lead to the highest form of government. There is first the idea that sovereignty is inherent in the People and that therefore the voice of the People is the voice of God. The voice of the People is by no means the same as the voice of God, and it is the voice of God that is sovereign. Secondly, the People are not always right nor any majority of them, and finally it is a fallacy to assume that man's obligation to obey the Law is in any real sense dependent on his having a voice in the making of it.

It has been said, moreover, that the French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Fraternity simply meant the idea of a brotherhood which would be created as the result of the other two ideals in action. Equality should have come as the result of Liberty thus creating the Fraternity. But consider what happened in France after the Revolution and is to-day a too common tendency in most democracies. Equality came before liberty : the belief that one man is as good as another was fundamental. That Jack is the equal of Jim may or may not be true, but in any case, it is not the function of democracy to claim that Jack is the equal of Jim but to provide liberty which will create conditions that shall enable Jack to become the equal of Jim or even a better man if he can and so desires. In other words, in a democracy, there should be no restriction of opportunity, especially in education in

the broadest sense, but the emphasis should always be placed on liberty and not on equality. To put the emphasis on the latter is the surest sign of a deteriorating democracy and leads not to liberty but to licence. Liberty is the religious, political and economic expression of the greatest reality in the world ; it is the embodiment of the spiritual personality in man.

It is here that the religious, political and economic aspects of democracy converge. It is here that we touch the inner conception of individual personality ; and respect for individual personality is at the root of real democracy. But if the root of real democracy is personality in the individual it will be clear that if democracy should become perverted by substituting for the individual the People, it will destroy its own moral and spiritual foundation. Now no system gives such opportunity for the play and interplay of mass emotion, and mass emotion is incompatible with that individuality for which democracy stands. Democracy gives room for mass emotion because it is so largely administered by mass meetings, demonstrations, conferences and the like, all of which are conducive to the herd instinct, especially when the masses are uneducated.

This is a great danger, particularly among the working-class ; thanks however to the great services that have been rendered to the people in this country by such institutions as the University Extension Movement and the Workers' Educational Association, this danger has been considerably mitigated, though much still remains to be done. These organizations have not only fostered a desire for education on the part of the working and middle classes, but also they have aimed at enabling the people to find their strength in spiritual power rather than in material benefits. This is the real stuff of which a great democracy is made—not propaganda, though there may well be a place for propaganda also in democracy, but it is not the same thing as education ; and education in the broadest sense, especially of the working-classes, is the only force that will save democracy in the long run. The working-classes, however, are not the only people who need to be educated for

democracy, though they are the main class, because they form the largest section of the population. Indeed, the greatest need of the present time is the education of democracy, for democracy is a comparatively new experience in the political and social history of the world. The assumption that every adult person is qualified for the responsibilities of citizenship is one that can be very easily disputed by those who know the educational standard to which a large proportion of the people have attained. Even if their function were only to choose the best man to represent them on any public body, it would still be true that an uneducated body of people would be lacking in the spiritual power of discernment needed for the task, but in fact the general body of electors is asked to give a verdict not merely on alternative persons but on alternative policies, involving intricate questions of foreign policy, questions concerned with the defence and government of an Empire and with economic and industrial matters affecting the general run of society.

This, and no less, is what modern democracy demands of the people. Plainly an undisciplined people who have not the ability to rely on spiritual power are quite unsuited to guide the intricate and delicate balances of the democratic machine. Democracy creates conditions for the full and unfettered development of man as a spiritual being: it also creates the conditions for his material welfare, but there must be a proper balance between the forces in the two spheres or democracy will be unable to withstand the strains imposed upon it. Moreover, democracy works through the system of representation, but the representatives are chosen in the heat of a pre-election fever in which the truths for which each party stands are palpably exaggerated, so that, in fact, the so-called free choice of the people is really conditioned, and each person tends to vote, not from a consideration of the general interest and welfare of the nation, but from the narrow class-conscious and individual economic point of view, thus creating a constant feud between those who believe in a capitalist democracy and those who advocate a complete Socialist system.

Social legislation, often of the most urgent kind, is impeded by the opposition of vested interest and this is not confined to any one class or party.

Let us turn now to the economic side of the problem. The economic expression of a State determines the nature of that State just as much as its religious or political counterpart ; in fact, it may very well do so to a much greater degree, and indeed in most democracies this is what has happened. Consider, for example, to what extent, both national and international, the policy of Great Britain is based to-day on primarily economic considerations. In point of fact, the State is in the main an economic entity with economic interests determining almost its entire policy, political theory and institutions being shaped largely to suit the predominance of the economic interests, with religion playing a very small part in the whole scheme of things.

Now in any complete democratic system the individual should have not only complete religious and political liberty but should have also complete economic freedom as well. This has never been the case in any of the leading democratic countries of the world. There was little of it in France and Britain in the days of *laissez faire*, and there is less to-day. In the United States of America—the so-called Land of Freedom—economic freedom is still less a marked feature of that country's development than is the case in either France or Britain. In the U.S.A. there is a complete religious freedom for the individual ; there is political freedom governed by checks, but there is no economic freedom. The State is completely a capitalist State, financial and industrial, with a psychology resting mainly on the virtue of private enterprise growing into joint stock in large trusts and combines.

But the predominance of a financial and industrial aristocracy is not necessarily incompatible with the existence of democratic institutions, though it does tend to weaken their authority. It tends, in fact, to create a bureaucracy, only of a different order from that established in the dictatorship countries—it creates the dictatorship of the expert

and the permanent staff. In Great Britain, Parliament tends more and more to be governed by the Cabinet and the Civil Service and municipalities by their departmental experts. In the State and in industry socialism has advanced rapidly, but so also has capitalism, and in finance, which has become the greatest power in the land, there is practically no socialism at all.

Many small capitalists unable to become rich by expanding their production on account of the competition of large-scale enterprise, speculate instead ; moreover, it is profitable for them to be merged into big business. Mr. J. A. Hobson, in his book *The Evolution of Capitalism*, states,

“The creation, absorption and supreme control of the most profitable forms of natural monopoly and other abnormally prosperous business impart a strength and solidity to the new financial oligarchy, which enable it to fasten its hold still more firmly on the necks of the proletariat of capital.”

This centralization of the funds of what Mr. Hobson has called the “proletariat of capital,” which is an international process, is the chief economic menace to the normal development of democracy.

In Great Britain since the war there has been a gradual intensification of capitalism in coal, cotton, iron and steel and agriculture, based more or less upon the idea of a planned system. It is, however, no part of this work to consider the merits of State planning. It is enough to say that a planned economy in a highly capitalised State is a dangerous experiment, even if Fascism is not the desired end. A corporate economic system can be as easily changed to Fascism as to Socialism, and whether in the long run it takes on the form of the one or the other will not depend so much on the nature of the institutions within the nation, as upon the nature and strength of finance capital. Quite apart from anything else, a strong oligarchic financial system will drive any nation towards Fascism with the greatest of ease.

Consider for a moment what happened in Germany in the economic and political spheres and compare that with what is happening in this country. In Germany in the

economic sphere there was a gradual change from the ordinary competitive capitalist system to a sharp monopolistic system, whilst in the political sphere there was a transformation from the Constitutional State to government by mass democracy in the Weimar Republic. For the control of the commodity market, capital was organized in the cartel, the trust and generally in the larger industrial unit, the larger unit being formed by the imposition of a quota and grouping system. Some of the industries were subsidized on a large scale, part directly and part by a tariff system, whilst all the time the power and influence of the State was growing.

Again, the system of mass democracy liberated the working-class from the domination of the capitalist political parties, whilst at the same time it intensified enormously their own class consciousness. This is a phenomenon which is by no means confined to any one country, and its appearance marks a new era in the power of the State, giving to it a far-reaching control over the lives of the people.

Moreover, in Germany a weakening capitalist system was buttressed by a system of intense rationalization and standardization, the former increasing the size of the unit and consequently increasing the number of officials, whilst the system of standardization reduced the number of skilled workmen but increased the number of technical experts and overmen who were required to rule and guide the mass of semi-skilled and unskilled workmen. A new bureaucracy was therefore created and as the markets contracted and competition intensified, the distributing apparatus actually grew, as well as the number of people employed on this side of industry. But what is more important than any of the above changes is the fact that behind them finance capital was increasingly concentrated, the whole structure of finance becoming more powerful and more oligarchic.

The development of this system was actually encouraged by the German Trade Union because at first it created a better wage level for the workers, and a similar development in this country has not met with discouragement

from any quarter. It is true that the two systems are not exactly analogous, but they are sufficiently alike for the difference to be immaterial. Both in Germany and in Britain it was very generally believed that the displacement of the workers from a particular industry would only be temporary and that they would be re-absorbed in the new machine-producing industries or other industries created by the rise in purchasing power, as a result of increasing production. This is a complete fallacy: the system creates a permanent structure of unemployment and such a system must inevitably collapse or at least create a major crisis, unless it is buttressed by some auxiliary scheme such as armament building which may hold the balance for a time. Reputable economists would not be surprised to see the unemployed figures in this country reach seven or eight millions if the armament building were to cease, in which case property would have to use its power in order to maintain its supremacy and this could only be done through State intervention.

In any major crisis monopoly capital must destroy democracy if it can, or else it will be destroyed itself. That is exactly what took place in Germany. We are of course tempted to think that Fascism could not happen in this country, but that is precisely what was said in Germany and Austria, and the economic causes which led to Fascism in these countries are undoubtedly at work here. It may be true to say that the soil is less favourable to its growth in this country than it was in either Germany or Italy, but the economic roots of Fascism are not national, they are universal; they lie partly in the failure of capitalism in a democracy to make the profit motive work, and partly in the weakness of democracy to fit into the complicated structure of the modern state or to find the best men to govern.

The nature of the economic system is therefore no less important for a democracy than is the nature of the religious-political forces. Moreover, there is little doubt that the rise of Fascism both in Italy and Germany was partly an attempt to preserve the community through a period of

economic disintegration. When the primary economic forces of production, distribution and exchange are dislocated and no purely economic remedy is acceptable, the authority of the State is invoked on the easy assumption that the economic disorder can be rectified by a system of planning and better organization, for the economic deadlock generally leads to moral recklessness and social disorder and, in consequence, the strong arm of the State is welcomed by those economic interests which become dominant in order to preserve them against the possibility of a revolutionary change.

Finally, it will be observed that there is a close relationship between democracy and Christianity, and it is by emphasizing the elements common to both that democracy can best be spiritualized. It is, moreover, contended that it is the weakness of democracy from the spiritual side that is its chief danger to-day. The people must be educated so that there may be a better balance between the spiritual and material forces. In other words the claims of personality must always come before the claims of property, otherwise there can be no real democracy. That does not mean that economic laws can be ignored for personal sentiment, but it does mean that strong protest must be made against persons being reduced to the status of cogs in a wheel and mere instruments of production. The democrat will certainly not, as was done in the French Revolution democracy, tend to place the whole emphasis on the rights of the People, for in the past, even where the rights asserted have been just and fair, they have not always been accompanied by a due sense of duty and higher obligation. But this demands a sound economic basis. It is futile to blame the masses of the people for lack of spiritual insight, if the economic conditions are such as to rob them of a fair chance of developing their spiritual nature. This is fundamental. Neither Germany nor Italy could have developed Nazi-ism and Fascism so easily if the immediate post-war economic conditions of their countries had been sound. Indeed the whole totalitarian movement has been tremendously stimulated by the slump of 1931.

CHAPTER X

THE RISE OF COMMUNISM AND FASCISM

RUSSIAN COMMUNISM

THE Bolshevik Revolution of Russia in 1917 was a startling event. Here was a vast country composed of rich land-owners on the one hand and an immense population of poverty-stricken, uneducated, untrained peasants on the other, with no industrial system at all comparable to that of the modern Western civilization, and yet out of this was to come the first real attempt led by intellectuals to set up a Socialist State. The Revolution of 1917 in Russia had indeed, on a small scale, a parallel in the First Fronde Rebellion in France over a century and a half previously, when the "Parliament" of Paris had revolted against the Government of the Court during the minority of Louis XIV. The revolt was short-lived and the lesson learnt in his youth proved thoroughly efficacious to the young king, who resolved at as early a stage as possible to gather into his own hands all the reins of power, so that Louis XIV became the most thoroughly autocratic of all the kings who have occupied the throne of France, and it was not till a hundred and forty years later in 1789 that the storm of the Revolution burst there.

The Russian Revolution in its vast proportions and in the boldness of its ideals was startling to the whole world, for here was a nation launching out towards Socialism without having gone through the preparatory stages under capitalism which seemed absolutely necessary even to the Socialists themselves. But Lenin saw that there was a possibility, even a probability, of success, for the Russian capitalist

system being weaker than that of any of the highly industrialized Western countries, could more easily be overthrown and indeed its resources were already exhausted by three years of war. He knew that it was impossible to go directly to real Communism, but he saw no reason why Russia should not accomplish the necessary intervening stages under a system of State capitalism rather than private capitalism.

With the news of the fall of Czarism, civil war broke out and at first almost every man's hand was against Lenin and his followers. The Whites, the supporters of Czarism, were at first backed by men and money from the Allied Powers, but gradually, the tide turned in favour of the Reds and they emerged victorious after three years of terrible civil war.

During these years Lenin had ruled Russia by a method of war Communism, by which the State took the workers' raw produce and in return rationed them with the finished article. But when the civil war was over the peasants saw no reason why they should continue to work for no profit and in their discontent they blamed the Government for everything that went wrong. In a famine which broke out in 1921, millions of people perished, and Lenin knew that unless he met the demands of the peasants they would refuse to sow the harvest of 1922. So he promised them a share in the profits, preferring thus to give way on his principles, for a time at least. He therefore proclaimed a new economic policy which enabled the peasants to keep what they marketed, and in the towns too private trade was re-established.

By the end of the following year the risk of starvation had passed and gradually the system of private trading was abandoned, the peasants being encouraged to merge their smallholdings, receiving in return a share in the larger collective profits. In the towns also private enterprise was stage by stage controlled, all the productive forces coming under the power of the Government, and Russia thus becoming a Collectivist State.

The problem still remained as to how to knit together

in a Socialist community such a large number of people, amounting to 150 millions spread over $8\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles and speaking more than 60 different dialects. Lenin's method was by a system of self-government, by Soviets with the backing of the Communist Party. Every town and village had to send representatives to the District Soviet, which in turn sent representatives to the Central Soviet of the Republic. The country was divided into six republics which together comprised the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which in turn sent representatives to the Union Congress of Soviets, from which was elected a small body to direct the affairs of the Union, this body being called the Central Committee of Commissars. The first President of the U.S.S.R. was Kaminiev, a Jew, and Lenin was General Secretary to the Communist Party, which position virtually made him Dictator of Russia.

The Constitution was completed in 1923. The genius behind the whole movement was Lenin, and he had accomplished a superhuman task. But in so doing he had exhausted himself and in the following year he died, the idol of a whole generation of people, as great a hero in Russia as Napoleon had been in France a century before.

The system which was established in 1923 has undergone a great many changes since then, so that it is difficult to convey to anyone brought up under the Western democratic system any clear idea of the scope and function of the different governing bodies, or even on what principle their representatives are chosen. This seems to be done by committees of various kinds. There are, for instance, works committees, the foundation of which is not clearly defined, nor does there seem to be any way by which a decision of the factory committee may be challenged by the workers. It seems to be taken for granted that the members of the committees are capable of carrying out the general will of those they represent. However, it is not our concern here to examine in detail how the system is worked, but rather to trace its ideological tendencies, and to examine the nature of the economic and political forces in relation to those that exist in the Western world.

The whole system has been formed into a dictatorship just as much as German Nazi-ism or Italian Fascism. A Dictatorship of the Proletariat is no less a dictatorship than one of any other form, though its result may be quite different, as well as the methods used to bring about that result.

These dictatorships are the practical application of a single side of a complete and coherent philosophy of the State. There are the two distinct sides to Hegel's picture of the State, and Communist Dictatorship is mainly the practical application of one of them, whilst Fascist Dictatorship is mainly the practical application of the other. Both systems are alike in the respect that both insist on the power of the State, but in the case of Fascism the power of the State is likely to grow, or at least not to diminish with greater and better organization, whereas in the case of Communism the power of the State, and indeed the State itself, will "wither away" with the better discipline of the people and the better organization of the economic and cultural forces within it. At least, this is what Marx divined and the Russian Soviet system is avowedly based on the Marxian theory.

Moreover, in the case of Fascism, while the Revolution changed the political nature of the State, it did not to any great extent alter the manner in which the economic forces within the State were expressed. In Russia, on the contrary, there was not only an alteration in the political structure of the State but there was a fundamental and radical change in the whole economic and social system. Thus the basic idea behind the Russian Revolution is in the attempt to change the whole underlying economic system, whereas the basic idea in Fascism is to change the whole political system, though in both cases the authority of the State had to be employed in order to accomplish this. In other words in Russia the authority of the State is being used, presumably only for a time, in order to destroy itself and to raise up finally the classless society which will then govern of its own accord. In Fascism, on the other hand, the State remains in a position of complete authority.

Theoretically this is a fundamental difference, as it not only means that in Russia the emphasis is placed on the economic expression whilst in Italy or Germany emphasis is placed on the political, but it means that in Russia the individual is of prime importance, whereas in Fascism it is the State that occupies that position, the individual being only a cog in the wheel of the State machine. In Hegelian style the individual in a Fascist State must submit to the authority of the State and must sacrifice his individuality in its interests.

Philosophically speaking this raises an important and far-reaching question, because in the case of Fascism the system tends to depersonalize the individual, whereas in the case of Communism the tendency should be theoretically in the long run to enthrone personality, and individual personality is so truly a Christian principle, that it is from Christianity that the whole idea has sprung. Thus we are faced with the spectacle of Russia, an avowedly anti-Christian nation, attempting to follow a course in politics and economics which, if it can be worked out in practice to its logical conclusion, will make the most of the Christian grace of personality, whereas in Italy, which is a Christian nation, the power of personality is weakened through the system of Fascism, whose ideology is based, at least to some extent, on the ethics of Christianity. This is the result of the application of a confused Hegelianism.

So far we have made a short comparison between the ideologies of Russian Communism and Italian and German Fascism, but what about the practical application of the Russian ideology ? Is it now possible to put the Russian ideal into practice in the present international circumstances ? Is it not the case that the necessary fundamental conditions have broken down ? This is worth looking into.

Russian Communist ideology was definitely based upon the Marxian concept, and the Marxian analysis has been generally believed to posit a complete and world-wide breakdown of imperial capitalism, with the consequent arrival of Socialism on all fronts more or less simultaneously.

This has not happened, despite the fact that Russia set out after the Revolution to make it happen. She sent Soviet missionaries into all the leading countries of the world to preach the gospel of Communism and to form Soviet cells within these countries. She even backed this up by sending money in some cases to help the propaganda and at one time indeed it looked as if she was going to be successful.

In Italy before the Revolution, Soviets were making great headway with their propaganda ; in Germany there was a political revolution which looked like the prelude to a far-reaching social revolution ; in Hungary and Bavaria, Soviet governments were actually set up ; and in Great Britain the returned soldiers together with the industrial classes created a situation culminating in the general strike of 1926, which was definitely alarming to the whole of the governing classes. But the Russian leaders never for a moment entertained the idea that they could maintain their revolutionary position, unless other nations could be speedily converted to Communism, and in order to bring this about they immediately set up the "Third International" of Communist Political Parties (Comintern) and the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern) to help to induce revolution in the leading capitalist countries of the world, and moreover they were satisfied that in order to accomplish world revolution a match had only to be put to the powder.

But as time passed they saw their mistake, for world revolution was not so easy to bring about as they had thought. No country was inclined to follow their example. This was not only defeat outside but it was also the cause of a great deal of strife among the Russian leaders. They had now to consider whether they were to continue the policy of world revolution, or whether they would fall back upon a nationalist policy. The protagonists in the contest were Stalin and Trotsky, Trotsky standing for the maintenance of world revolution and Stalin for the nationalist policy. In the end Trotsky was decisively defeated and is now an exile from the country. The nationalist policy

was adopted and Russia is steadily engaged in coming to terms with the capitalist world. She became a member of the League of Nations and has made a treaty with France for mutual protection in case of invasion.

Even if it is agreed that Russia has managed to introduce many valuable socialistic ideas into the country, making the conditions of living and work much better for the people than anything that existed prior to the Revolution, and moreover if it is also agreed that Russia is passing through an industrial revolution, that is in some way comparable to the industrial revolution of the West, and that she has managed to escape the worst horrors and inhumanities that took place in the West, the question still remains, what is to be the future of Russia ?

Will the force of political circumstances outside be stronger than the force of economic circumstances inside and drive her back to capitalism ? That she has had to recede a long way from her original ideal is beyond all question, and moreover she cannot remain as she is, she must either go to the Right or to the Left. She began by following the dictates of Karl Marx, she is now engaged in putting into operation the ideals of Sydney Webb. The Marxists say that with the completion of Socialism the State will pass away, but no State dare pass away (unless it affects to pass into the hands of some other State) so long as it is living in continual fear of attack by other adjacent capitalist States, and the power of capitalism is stronger in the world to-day than it has ever been before in any period of human history.

As we have seen, it was the very ardour of Russian Communism in seeking to proselytize other countries, which strengthened the forces against her. In particular her fierce antagonism to the Russian Church, and hence to the Christian religion (for she threw out the baby with the bath), made for her bitter enemies of many who otherwise would have admired her gallant attempt to accomplish the well-being of all her subjects. To-day she has realized her mistake, and she knows that religion is an essential part of the human expression. She is already prepared to

make concessions and it looks as if before long there may be in Russia, as there is in the United States of America, complete freedom of religious expression. But it is impossible to predict whether, surrounded as she is by States that are predominantly capitalistic, she will ultimately be able to realise her Communistic ideals for the people.

FASCISM

One of the outstanding phenomena of recent years has been the rise of Italy from the status of an unconsidered land of poverty and ruins to that of one of the important nations of the world. The national revival which has taken place there within the last fifteen years is one of the greatest in history.

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 Italy's government was comparable to that of England; namely, a constitutional monarch and democratic parliament. But fundamentally there was a great difference, as Italy had been united as a nation for only some forty years and there was in consequence no national tradition, no binding loyalty. The official life therefore in all its phases was corrupt.

The outbreak of war in 1914 placed Italy in a very difficult position. Bound by the Triple Alliance of 1882 to assist Germany or Austria in case of attack, she argued that they were engaged in an aggressive war. Early in 1915 she was still undecided, but the Allies were making her very attractive promises if she would come in on their side. It was then that Benito Mussolini first attracted public notice. As the editor of a Socialist newspaper he was expelled from his party for advocating that Italy should join the Allies and enter upon war against the Central Powers. But Mussolini, nothing daunted, founded an independent paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, in which he put forward his opinions and met with immediate success.

When the war finished in 1918 Italy was disappointed with the results so far as she herself was concerned, and among the young men who viewed these results as disproportionate to the great Italian past and the part she

had played in the war was Mussolini. In 1919 he formed at Milan a party of a hundred and fifty members which he called a "Fascio," taking the name from the Roman *fascies* which had been carried in the processions in the great days of ancient Rome—a bundle of rods bound tightly round an axe to symbolize the close union of individuals round a dictator. Mussolini's party grew until in October 1922, numbering 30,000 black-shirted Fascists, they were able to march from Milan to Rome. From that day Mussolini has been in power in Italy. The Communists had already gained a hold there and Mussolini exaggerated the danger so that the Fascists would be regarded as the liberators of their country, and when in December of the same year twenty-two Italian Communists were murdered in their homes, the murderers were publicly honoured.

But Mussolini was determined to do more than simply rid the country of the Communist menace. He was determined to graft Fascism into its Constitution and so galvanize Italy into new life. The changes were made by ordinary Acts of Parliament. Firstly with regard to election methods—the Act for Electoral Reform of 1923 decreed that each electoral party should submit a list of candidates numbering two-thirds of the total number of seats. The party gaining the highest number of votes (provided they numbered a quarter of the total) was to have its list of candidates elected *en bloc*. The remaining third of the seats was then to be distributed proportionately among the other parties. The Act virtually destroyed all parties other than Fascist, as it was easy for the latter to obtain a quarter of the electors' votes and thus gain a majority in the House.

Secondly, as regards Mussolini himself, who was designated Prime Minister, he was made responsible to the King alone : he could not be forced to resign by a vote of no confidence in the House, as is the case in Britain, nor could any motion be proposed without his consent. Further, if any of his bills were rejected he could reintroduce them to be voted on again after a lapse of three months. In the third place, it was made legal for the Cabinet to decree Orders in Council which were made binding as laws, whether Parliament

agreed or not. By these three Acts of Parliament Mussolini became the legal dictator of Italy, and a fourth Act, the Labour Charter of 1927, laid the foundations of the new united and industrialized Italy.

In the labour charter provision was made for co-operation between workers and employers. In each branch of industry there was to be a union of workers and a union of employers and from these unions representatives in equal numbers were to meet in a Corporation which was to control the whole branch of the particular industry through its permanent officials. If the representatives failed to agree on any issue, it was to be decided by a court of law whose decision would be enforced by the police. To ensure the predominance of the Fascist Party in industry, Mussolini decreed that there should be one Union only in each branch, and that an organization having a membership of a tenth of the total workers in the branch could be recognized as the official Union. It was therefore not difficult for the Fascist organizations to obtain recognition as the official Unions, and they were entitled to claim contributions to Union funds from every worker, whether Fascist or not.

Mussolini's aim was to combine the advantages of initiative and competitive work which belong to Capitalism, with the central control and protection for the worker afforded by Socialism. State intervention was therefore to take place when private initiative was lacking or when the political interests of the State were involved. The smooth working of such arrangements is bound to excite the admiration of all, and the only feature that arouses distrust is the careful guarding of the interests of Fascism from criticism, through the strict censorship of the press, the theatre and all forms of the expression of private opinion. As far as Italy herself is concerned, this enforcing of one view and one view only is not unacceptable, for having been through centuries the seat of ancient Rome and the Catholic Church, she has never been accustomed to toleration or individualism.

In his early days Mussolini had been a follower of Sorel,

the French Syndicalist. The basic idea of both Syndicalism and Guild Socialism was to have self-government in industry. They stood for the conduct of industry through self-governing corporations of workers by hand and brain and, though Guild Socialism did recognize the need for a political State, the State was thought of not as a sovereign controlling entity but rather as a federal body which had emanated from the working of the independent industries. But he had now largely departed from this view and there is a substantial difference between the independent self-governing trade-unions of the Syndicalist or Guild Socialist Movement and the organized and disciplined trade-unions of Italy working under the direct authority of the State. The astonishing hold gained by Mussolini over the people can be accounted for to some extent by his personality, which knows no fear or hesitation, his intuitive understanding of the minds of the people, their desires and ambitions, and his all-absorbing vision of a great and united Italy.

The end of the war had left Italy in a condition bordering on political and economic chaos and, as we have already seen, Mussolini regarded the Communist Movement as a serious menace to the very existence of Italy as a nation. Her democratic system had never been strong, and Mussolini felt that a complete change was necessary. From syndicalism to fascism—the transition was not difficult, particularly in the special conditions which prevailed in Italy after the war. On the one hand was the exalted spirit of the people, aroused by their victory over the Austrians in an engagement in which they were indeed aided by divisions of the Allies, but which has gone down in Italian history as the glorious victory of Vittorio Veneto, while on the other hand a break-up of the Italian nation appeared to be imminent owing to disastrous strikes and the disordered condition of the country.

The Fascism of Mussolini was Italian nationalism, with the inspiration of the greatness of Ancient Rome coming down to them out of the past. It soon developed the character of the mystical Hegelian nationalism, with the conception of the Totalitarian State as its basis. Hegel

had denied that there can be any social organism more ultimate than the national State, and Mussolini accepted this view, thus rejecting the possibility of any real international State or even any federation of States embodying an international consciousness. For Hegel and for Mussolini the national State is the absolute and ultimate being, more real than either the individuals or groups which compose it, and having an absolute claim upon the loyalty of its members. Classes, therefore, cannot exist independently but only as agencies for the distribution of functions within the State ; there can be no community of class extending beyond the national borders because the class is merely a part of the national consciousness of the particular State.

Fascism thus followed traditions of ancient Rome and the Roman Catholic Church in re-introducing a political and religious universalism, attained not through the self-discipline of freedom but through obedience to authority. Mussolini has restored to Italy her traditional ideal of a Christian orthodox State, and his Fascism aims at educating modern Italy in a self-sacrificing nationalism. Let us briefly quote from his work *Il Fascismo* :

“The State is a metaphysical being ; the State becomes the conscience and will of the people ; it is the State which shapes individuals to civic virtue, which makes them conscious of their social purposes, and which leads them to unity.

“The State harmonizes their interests in a system of justice. The State spreads the triumphs of intellect throughout the domain of science, of art, of law and of humanity ; it raises mankind from the simple life of the tribe to the highest human expression of power, which is empire. It hands down through the ages the names of those who perished in preserving it or obeying its commands, and it presents as examples to the generations to come the captains who widened its boundaries and the men of genius who crowned it with glory. Where the love of the States grows faint and dissolvent, and centrifugal tendencies of individuals and groups grow strong, these nations are advancing to death !”

This conception of the State is highly mystical as well as idealist. But Hegel's philosophy of the State, as we have seen, had two sides, one side dealing with the nature of

the State, and the other dealing with the dynamic treatment of human history. Fascism accepts the former and leaves out the latter, whilst Communism accepts the latter and discards the former. The "Totalitarianism" of Fascism is therefore a much simpler idea than Hegel's complex conception of the State and, as some would say, is definitely based on the more reactionary side of his philosophy.

But if the purely political side of Fascism was based mainly upon one side of Hegel's philosophy of the State, the development of the system has been along practical lines much in the same way as Socialism has developed in Great Britain. It has been objective rather than subjective. There is, for example, very little likeness between the theoretical Fascist programme of 1919 and that which was put into operation after the march on Rome. In fact the only initial idea which still remains is the constant insistence on the unity of the nation, and on the weakness of the old liberal-democratic State to achieve this unity or to give Italy a place among the leading nations of the world.

Italian Fascism is therefore a movement towards a greater political and economic nationalism within the State. Such a conception is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of a League of Nations, because it means that a Fascist State can only remain a member of the League so long as the League does nothing to limit a very corporate and detailed national sovereignty. But the League of Nations is not a cosmopolitan body ; at best it is merely an international ideal, a linking of the nations together in some way without in any sense denying the ultimate validity of national powers or divisions. The League itself with its Council and its Assembly attempts to create an international parliament, the Council as Cabinet, the Assembly as Legislature, with an International Labour Office collecting data on which to work.

But even so the League of Nations is much too internationalist in tone to suit the ideas of the leaders of a Fascist State or even a quasi-Fascist State. The rank and file of the League of Nations Union in Britain and in some

of the European countries, not realizing how thoroughly the structure of the League of Nations is based upon the conception of the absolute sovereignty of each national State, have been trying to push it more and more into a far-reaching internationalism. For instance, they want to limit national power in the making of war and peace, they want to restrict armaments and promote international treaties and arbitration, as well as to create a league international public opinion which shall be effective in checking imperialist aggression. But no Fascist State could accept this philosophy of Liberalism extended from a national to an international scale. Fascism views the State itself as the final arbiter in all matters pertaining to the State, and is therefore a complete reversal of the old nineteenth-century idea of nationalism. The nationalism of the German Revolution of 1848 or of the Revolution of the same year in Italy was a democratic ideal for the building up of governments by parliament. Mazzini was a great nationalist and embodied in his nationalism a considerable number of the international ideas which the advanced League of Nations enthusiasts of to-day are seeking to express. But Cavour, though a Liberal statesman too, had not exactly the same ideas as Mazzini, and in fact the liberal nationalism of the nineteenth century was much more of his making than it was of Mazzini's, for, as each country became nationalist, it succeeded more and more in equipping itself with responsible parliamentary institutions, thus giving it a power and a lever to be not only nationalist but also to be imperialist as well.

Of course, until the war, economic imperialism was quite consistent with parliamentary democracy, as many of the countries with the latter form of government were quite as amenable to economic imperialism as any aristocracy could possibly be. But in the new world-situation created by the war, an imperialist and oligarchic economic system was not so easily hitched to a democratic state-machine, hence a new state nationalism had to be created, and this was done by uniting the old antagonists of the nineteenth-century nationalism, viz. the military and the landed

proprietors with their former enemies the industrial and commercial classes. The functioning together of these two influential sections of the community gave a new impetus to the idea of economic nationalism and imperialism, and the State took on the Fascist form in order to make the new economic system effective. Thus the Italian State was adapted, and is constantly being re-adapted to the changes in the economic forces within the system.

We have seen above, that Mussolini's plan for Italy was to restore the traditional ideal of a Christian orthodox State, thus recalling the Mediæval Synthesis, the concordat that prevailed in the Middle Ages. At that time, indeed, it was the Church mainly that was in the ascendant, whereas to-day in Italy it is the State, and to that extent Mussolini is the follower of Machiavelli.

Since 1870, when Italy became a united nation and the kingdom of Italy absorbed all the Papal States, the Pope had been virtually a prisoner in the Vatican. But in 1929 Mussolini made a concordat with the Holy See, by which the Pope once more became a temporal sovereign, ruling now over a tiny walled kingdom in the middle of Rome. With the Concordat Catholicism became once more the recognized religion of Italy ; the Catholic faith was taught in the State schools and Catholic priests were taken under State protection. It seemed that peace was at last established between the Papacy and the Italian nation.

But as we have already observed, Mussolini's Totalitarian State recognizes no community of class extending beyond the national borders, no internationalism : and Catholicism, on the contrary, is nothing if it is not international. The Pope soon began to fear that in giving his support to Fascism with its militantly national air, he might be antagonizing faithful Catholics of other nations. Moreover, he foresaw grave danger to peace and even to Christianity itself in the way that Fascist principles were applied. The Fascist oath in particular came under his condemnation. It is taken by children of fourteen who declare, " I swear to execute the orders of Il Duce without discussion, and to serve with all my force, if need be with my blood, the cause

of the Fascist revolution." The Pope regards such an oath as unlawful in that it "snatches the young from the Church and from Jesus Christ and inculcates in its own young people hatred, violence and irreverence." Mussolini for his part saw the possibility of Church organizations interfering unduly with Fascist activities and, therefore, forbade them to provide games or athletics for their members.

Thus, at the moment, relations between Fascism and the Pope are definitely strained, and it is a matter of serious doubt whether Fascism will ultimately prove an ally of Catholicism or its rival. All that can be said with certainty is that the half-national, half-religious ideal which Mussolini has put before the people has aroused their impassioned enthusiasm and they believe whole-heartedly both in the man and in his doctrine.

NAZI-ISM

In Germany the new system of National Socialism was brought into being when Adolf Hitler obtained power by a legal vote of the people in January 1933. From the moment that Hitler obtained power, Germany took on a new soul. She advanced to his call as if she knew at once that her destiny was inherent in her own inmost force, her hidden subconscious central power, and Hitler impressed upon the people that character is the measure of a nation's destiny. He taught the people, as Schiller had done in *Wallenstein*, that the fate of a people should be sought not outside "in a dark horizon" but in its own breast. This was the sort of philosophy to awaken and inspire in a despairing nation a new national consciousness and to give new faith and a regenerated hope to a crestfallen people—and it did so perhaps for the first time in the history of Germany, with a real political passion.

With the new and younger generation who had had no part in the Great War, and who were unwilling to be hampered by its paralysing obligations, a new type of State was born with all the marks of enthusiastic adolescence upon it. Germany would never again be great in the

comity of democratic nations so she must forge for herself a new ideology of government.

The accomplishment of this great political ideal involved a battle on three different fronts at the same time and consequently three different forces were marked out as enemies. These three forces were Communism, the Jews and Democracy. The new State was to be anti-Marxist, anti-Semitic and anti-Democratic.

Before Hitler came to power in Germany, Communist votes had risen to over five million ; to-day Communism is not discussed seriously as a possible form of society, but is judged as a crime in itself and a ruthless war is waged against it by the State among all sections of society. Communism is publicly denounced as a political enemy and a religious danger ; it is accused of declaring this world's existence as the sole reality.

Anti-Semitism is also a main article of the Nazi creed. This is not an idea that took shape with the coming of Hitler to power. It had in fact its roots deep down in the physical and metaphysical antagonisms aroused by the Jews in the time of the Roman Emperors. The antipathy to Jews was re-activated partly by the personal hatred of Hitler and partly by the dominant influence that the Jewish people had acquired by money and intellect in the Weimar Republic, an influence which was quite disproportionate to their numbers among the German population. Moreover, the loyalty of the Jew to the country was considered uncertain, as national patriotism was for him always a secondary matter.

The anti-democratic attitude of the new German State shows itself in the hatred of the present rulers of Germany for its immediate past history. They look back rather to the distant past, to the days of the great German Empire, which was known as the Holy Roman Empire, for it took its place alongside the Holy Roman Church as two aspects of one thing, the Emperor being regarded as God's vicar in temporal things and the Pope in things spiritual. The Empire lasted from the eighth century till it was finally abolished by Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth.

German imperial domination was at its height in the eleventh century under Henry III, its territory extending from the North Sea to the Alps and including Lombardy, and from the Rhine eastwards and including Hungary. During all this period the history of Germany is inextricably interwoven with that of all mediæval Europe, and we make no attempt to review it but merely to recall certain periods and events which appear to have a definite bearing on the situation to-day.

German domination in Northern Italy ceased about the middle of the thirteenth century, and though the Empire was still for centuries powerful in the hands mostly of the Habsburgs of Austria, yet the individual petty kings and dukes became increasingly independent. By the time of Napoleon the power of the Holy Roman Empire had declined to a mere shadow, and it was abolished by him in 1806, the Emperor releasing all the German States from their allegiance to him and taking the title, Emperor of Austria. But Napoleon's conquest had for Germany at least one beneficial result and all unwittingly he was to some extent responsible for the revival of the Empire he had abolished, for he showed Germany how impossible was a cluster of jealous provincial little governments in the centre of Europe.

Among these states Prussia emerged into prominence under the Great Elector (1640-88), who was the first notable Hohenzollern, and under his great-grandson, Frederick the Great, Prussia definitely took its place as the leading German state, and at his death it was the chief military and political power in Europe. Frederick had, however, no notion of bringing about the union of the German States, his outlook being limited to Prussia. He had, it is true, liberal views and would have tried to alleviate the conditions of serfdom which still obtained in Prussia, but his ambitions for his country necessitated a strictly disciplined state obedient to the rule of a strong man, and his autocracy, while making Prussia great for a time, was also the cause of its rapid decline later, so that when Napoleon marched into Berlin in 1806 he declared it was a country hardly worth taking.

The great Frederick, far from having any desire to unite the German States, had carried on a fierce war against Austria which left that country much impoverished, but considerably increased the power of Prussia. By his wars too against France and Russia, and by his internal development of the country, he raised its prestige to such an extent that he gave to the other German States a sense of pride and security, and a new impetus in cultural life, and thus unconsciously he paved the way for their union.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century when Prussia was a defeated abject country, its rise against the tyrant must be attributed to the very excess of that tyrant's humiliating scorn, but also to the enlightened measures of Von Stein's ministry, which included greater freedom in administration, the suppression of the internal customs dues and the abolition of serfdom. In his tyrannical pride Napoleon caused Prussia to be raided for recruits to compose an army 20,000 strong to fight for him against Russia. May we not find in the subconscious effects of such treatment of the people one source at least of that harshness that even to-day characterizes the Prussian race? The "long effects" of history are frequently of more far-reaching importance than the immediate results.

When therefore this Prussian army, detailed to fight for the tyrant Napoleon, found an opportunity after his reverse at Moscow of turning the tables upon him, the serfs who had obtained their freedom several years before flocked in their thousands as volunteers to take part in the war of liberation. The Protestant preacher and philosopher Schleiermacher fired their patriotism to a religious fervour, and Prussia was liberated from the French yoke. Similarly in the war of 1870, the patriotism of the German States was so roused that they at last joined together under the leadership of Prussia, Bismarck having prepared the way by his stupendous task of the unifying of the tariffs.

In the "Hall of Mirrors" in the Palace of Versailles, William I of Prussia became Emperor of Germany and thus sixty-four years after the dissolution of the old Empire, Germany became again a single state, though without

Austria. But the "Pan-Germanic" idea of the eleventh-century golden period of the German Empire was not dead, and in 1882 the dual kingdom of Austria-Hungary made a Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, thus strengthening the Hohenzollern ambition for world domination. Pan-Germanism was an ideal of the German peoples in 1914, and when Hitler crossed the borders of Austria in March 1938 this was his aim and his ideal. The German Empire of the great days of the Middle Ages has been the star leading him forward. But it is to be hoped that the Holy Roman Empire with its claims of universal autocratic sway, its dominion over peoples of a different blood and speech, will not exercise further fascination, and that on the contrary the new State in its Pan-German ideal will be based on that principle of nationality to which the theory of the Holy Roman Empire was conspicuously opposed.

We may further ask whether the Hitler despotism will prove a permanent force, or whether, once the author's strong hand is removed, the State will decline as it did after the autocratic rule of Frederick the Great had come to an end. Democracy is still a great European tradition and the new German State claims to be a better form of democracy than that hitherto existing. It betokens the end of the French Revolution democracy which had paralysed Europe, for in the opinion of the Nazis democracy on the Continent of Europe had been proved by its history to be a dangerous political poison everywhere, because democratic liberty, the rights of the individual, and the will to power, which are the driving forces of democratic parties, were not checked by a higher morality, by the will to serve, and a due sense of responsibility. Liberalism in the political as well as in the religious sphere is judged as the impotence of an intellectualistic or æsthetic age, lacking stamina, and in its swollen self-conceit not even aware of its own defects. Democracy, according to the Nazi view, stands only ideally for the right of the individual but in practice very loath to give to the individual a place worthy of his real value. The new German democracy, it is contended, loathing the former party strife, gave willingly

and by a legal vote a unique place to a son of the people who challenged its honour, its self-respect and its courage, and showed it a promised land flowing with milk and honey, a land of universal welfare with all the glories and blessings of the re-born self-consciousness of a free people.

The whole of this ideology, which is a heavy indictment on Capitalist Democracy, appears to be dominated by three main constructive conceptions. The first is the view taken that the nation is a biological unity (*Weseneinheit*). The people is the "source of all strength", and love for the nation may be credited to the *Führer* (leader) as being a stronger motive for his actions than personal ambition or dictatorial power.

Hitler, the son of the people, has absorbed the old mythical ideas of the origin and the life-forces which give nobility of character to a pre-destined nation. It was this belief in the power of fate shaping subjective forces that became the dominant influence in Hitler's philosophy and led him, with a strong sense of security, not only to a powerful position, but towards that new nationalistic political religion which he was able to kindle in the soul of millions of his people.

But this belief in the inner forces of the community was not a faith in the intelligence of the masses. For Hitler, as for Bismarck, the voice of the people was not the voice of God. "Everything of the people, for the people, but not by the people" was the conviction which enabled Hitler to combine an enthusiasm and love for the nation with a real contempt for the masses of the people. The masses he believed were not capable of self-government; they were not even capable of selecting the best representatives to govern. They needed a leader, a man capable of touching the deeper hidden forces and instincts of the race.

The second idea in the National-Socialist ideology is that of race. Race is the objective aspect of that reality of which the soul is the subjective; it is the fount from which all life flows and gives the higher values to a nation. This race doctrine is not new and was not discovered by Hitler;

it was advocated by the French count Gobineau, by Nietzsche and by Bergson, and, in fact, is only the biological variant of the Marxian economic conception of history which is so strongly repudiated by National Socialism.

The third constructive element in the new German State is the ideology of the State itself. Hegel believed the State to be the supreme incarnation of God ; it was a metaphysical being. For National Socialism the State is the supreme incarnation of the race constituted by the same blood. It is the political *Wesengehalt* (structure of the being) of the nation, its purpose being the creation and maintenance of a society of individuals who belong to the same physical and mental type. The individuals have a right to existence only in relation to the State to which they are subordinated. The State controls all inner and outer forces of the nation. It is totalitarian and every individual is subject completely to its dictates in all spheres of life.

This then is the new German State ideology based mainly on Hegel's views of the State, together with the race psychology of the pure Nordic blood, which was countenanced by Nietzsche and Bergson and preached before the war by Houston Chamberlain. Wotan and not Christ is, as many of them proclaim, the real God of the Nazi creed.

Germany's economic troubles are attributed to the injustices imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles and other Peace Treaties. She claims she has also suffered from the enemies within her gates, namely Jews and Marxians, who were preaching an international doctrine. With the new ideology based on race and nationalism, she had to rid the country of these enemies as well as repudiate the obligations of the peace treaties.

CHAPTER XI

CHURCH AND STATE

THE present age is one of immense crisis both for Church and State. The fall of thrones, the rise of new states, the discarding of old religions, the enthusiastic embracing of new faiths—all these, encircled by a girdle of armaments on an unprecedented scale, makes a future heavy with great and tragic possibilities. Church and State which have controlled civilization throughout the centuries cannot abandon man to-day, involved in a whirlpool of ruthless currents, but must between them evolve some better form of civilization more suited to his true nature. And while in the past they have often combated each other for power, each being jealous of the boundary line differentiating their spheres of influence, to-day there is a call for close co-operation, for those spheres are no longer clearly defined and it will take all the best efforts of both institutions working in unison, to divert the tide of civilization into a better channel.

Their difficulty in the past was in the first place as to what really constituted spiritual and material values, the Church having a claim to the spiritual sphere and the State to the material. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's" is a perfect maxim, provided the spheres are well defined. But where they are ill defined, as they are to-day, to consider as some would have us do, that the whole political and economic life of the people is the concern of the State, and only the private and inner life of the individual the concern of the Church, will not do. Moral values pervade both spheres, and the State, for the purpose of financial gain, might well

be prepared to secularize certain institutions and customs, to which procedure the Church rightly would take exception. This at once raises a point of issue between the two institutions.

If we follow the frontier-curve down through history between the Church and the State, we shall find that it oscillates to and fro at various points. Thus, during the Middle Ages the Church was supreme over the State and therefore controlled the whole moral and economic expression. This, as we have seen in a former chapter, is known as the Mediæval Synthesis, and many believed that it solved the problem of Christianity and economics in those days.

The Reformation liberated political forces from religion and hence was the forerunner of the State's national sovereignty, thus placing the State in a strong position in relation to the Church. In the centuries succeeding the Reformation there was a never-ending feud between Church and State, the Church fighting for Evangelical liberty and for the right of the spirit, in a world which was dominated more and more by the State's will to power. The climax was reached in the nineteenth century when the State definitely, as part of its power politics, ceased to be Christian and is to-day neutral from a religious point of view, mainly indifferent but often hostile to the Church. It has developed its own state philosophy based on the autonomy of reason, the will to power and the right of sovereignty. In doing so, it took from the Church a rich secular heritage which had come down to her from the Middle Ages; education, marriage and a great many social activities have all been torn away from the Church by the State, and the latter, by its systematic taxation of the people, has been able to give a better administration of at least some of these functions. The State system of education in this country, for example, is better organized and its teachers better paid than they were when the Church was in control, but education has been secularized and indeed it is now being used more and more to buttress the power politics of the State. The Church of Scotland transferred the whole of her schools and

colleges to the State, but her representatives are having less and less of a say in the administration of education in that country. The Church did much to place Scotland in the fore-front of education among the nations in the early days—a position which Scotland is rapidly losing. She transferred her schools on the assumption that the State was Christian, but her example has not been followed by the Roman Catholic Church or the Church of England and presumably will not be, on the broad ground that the State is not Christian. For a long time the Nonconformist Churches in England were on the side of the State, but of late they have changed their attitude in this matter as it has become increasingly clear that the policy of the State is largely secularist.

The fundamental problem of Church and State, however, has been raised anew by the rise of the totalitarian States in Europe. Russia, after the Revolution of 1917, acting upon the Marxian concept, got rid of both Church and State in their then existing form. They were both pronounced to be tyrannical and, with the overthrow of a tyrannical Church, religion had also to go.

For centuries there had existed in Russia two religions. There was the large State Church expressing the official orthodox religion, subject to the will of the Czar. It was imperialistic and wealthy, upholding the power of the State and the aristocracy, closing its eyes to the injustices of the lower classes and their social claims. In the monasteries there were indeed men of undoubted piety, spending their lives in asceticism, but taking no interest in world affairs or economic or social matters. But alongside the official Church, though in a secretive underground way, there was another religion which had existed in Russia since the seventh century. This was the religion of the Raskol or the Schism, the religion of the poorer classes and of a spiritual élite. It was enthusiastic and ascetic and believed in the bodily coming of Christ to rule ever the world for a thousand years. The criticism passed by Raskol believers on Church and State prepared the ground for political Nihilism and later for the radical attack on Church and

religion by the Bolshevist ideology. The fervent Raskol believers, with their eager looking for the imminent coming of Christ, hated the orthodox religion with its self-satisfaction, its egoism, and its indifference, and their hatred descended to the later enemies of the official Church, who, from viewing this religion as a merely ritualistic sacramental Church without any meaning for the hard facts of life, came to look on all religion as such, and termed it "opium for the people." Thus the ardour of the Raskol believers passed over to the Bolsheviks, who looked eagerly not for a new heaven but for a new earth.

Even so Christianity is not dead in Russia: it lives on here and there where people have met in secret for religious worship but it is only a few choice souls who can hold firmly to religion when all the conditions are contrary, who have, as Kierkegaard says, "the faith which, being weak, feels strong because it trusts no longer in the cogency of traditional thought-habits or theological deductions, but in the promise of the living God."

It is, however, in Italy and Germany particularly that the new attitude, especially among the young people, is making itself felt. Descartes' dictum, "*Cogito, ergo sum*,"¹ no longer satisfies the Italian and German youth, who say, on the contrary, "*Sum, ergo volo et cogito*."² Action comes first and only later comes reflection on the act, which was intuitive, while the life sentiment and the will to power pervade the whole of the people, giving them a vital collectivism or group feeling. Napoleon riding at the head of his army appeared to Hegel as the symbol of the "world soul," and this became his ideal and through him the ideal both of Italy and Germany. The God of Love has been dethroned and in His place has been set up the God of Power. Instead of a Christian Church based on the ethics of love we have now a State based on the ethics of power. It is indeed a religion, for there is a great idealism involved in the discipline of the individual and the sacrifice of his interests for those of the State. After an era of sceptical materialism

¹ *Cogito, ergo sum*: I think, therefore I exist.

² *Sum, ergo volo et cogito*: I am, therefore I will and I think.

this self-revelation of the inmost soul of the people holds the imagination as under a magic spell.

In Italy the State is not completely totalitarian ; the Church is still in charge of the religious expression of the people. The concordat between the Italian State and the Roman Church which was concluded in 1929 recognized Roman Catholicism as the only State religion, and its international sphere was acknowledged as "inherent to its nature, and in conformity with its tradition and the experiences of its world mission." The State also by its financial settlements secured the economic independence of the Holy See, whose free communication with the clergy of all lands was safeguarded. Moreover, Mussolini allows free scope to other religions, and so far as these agreements are concerned the religious situation would appear at the moment to be quite satisfactory.

But Mussolini is a man of action, impelled by a mystical force to act, and only later does he reflect on the action and explains it by this inner compelling power. For him the State is the Ultimate. It is only in the State that human and spiritual aims can be realized and to attain its interests all means are justified. Individualism and liberalism are totally rejected and for him "everything is in the State, nothing against the State and nothing outside the State," and even violence is permissible as a means of attaining the collective aims of the corporate State. He sees in society an infinite number of classes, together forming a unity, and these classes are dynamic not static, allowing the individual to move from one class into another by his own initiative and effort, but all subordinated to the advancement of the corporate State. His doctrine of the State is that a man must be willing to "live dangerously," sacrificing his interests for the State and so realizing a spiritual existence. His view is idealistic in that it has faith in ultimate values, and it is realistic in that it calls for immediate action.

And by his amazing intuitive force Mussolini has gained a hold upon the people of all classes. From Sorel he learnt that a social myth is born only when the masses are on the move, so he organized his march on Rome and kept them

moving according to his principle of the continuous revolution. In his view the Italian people is "precious metal. For melting it together and making it a work of art, a man is needed who knows the people, loves it, leads it even by using violence." We have said that his doctrine of the State is idealistic in that it has faith in ultimate values but it should be noted that the ultimate is Force, or the Will to Power, and conflict with the Christian Church is thus inevitable.

In Germany the great drive is to turn the Church into a mere appendage of the State, and thus to make it a religious institution working for the particular spiritual and moral ends which the State has in view. In the same way the trade-unions have been used to fit into its economic ends. It is remarkable that the trade-union movement made no stand against Totalitarianism. It may be true that the Communist movement in Germany weakened the whole Labour resistance, through their mutual antagonism, but that does not explain fully its complete collapse.

The State in Germany to-day is completely totalitarian and transcendent to every other institution, whose ideals must be adapted to fit into those of the State. There must be unity of expression, political, economic and religious, and through the intuitive magnetic power of Hitler the State has been, as it were, wrought into a concrete block. The ease with which this has been done is amazing. As in the case of Italy, so too in the case of Germany, a strong leader has rid the people of their inferiority complex among the nations, and has gained an ascendancy over them that bears him along as on the crest of the wave. Hitler has magnetized not only one class but all classes. He has been accepted as their leader and indeed almost as a second Son of God.

But when one looks at some of the tenets of National Socialism and sees how completely they are at variance with Christian doctrine it is difficult to understand why there has not been more resistance from the Church.

Let us briefly state a few of these tenets :

"The aim of education is to inculcate love of one's own race as the highest act."

"Religion must be subjected and adapted to the law of the race."

"The first principle and the highest rôle of universal order is the instinct of the race."

"There is a greater difference between the higher and lower races of humanity, for example, Aryans and Jews, than between the lower races and the animals."

"The vigour of the race and the purity of the blood must be conserved in every circumstance, and all that serves this aim is honest and permissible."

"Nothing exists but the cosmos or living entity (*ens vivens*)."

"The individual exists only for the State and on account of the State."

And further, the Hitler Youth are trained to say, "Whoever serves Germany serves God."

This is a complete reversal of that true order of things which Christianity, more than any other single influence, introduced into civilized society, infringing, as it does, not only on the free personality of the individual but also on the corporate associations upon whose bases society, rightly understood, is built. It must be clearly evident to the Church that the Totalitarian State has not only gathered to itself an unsatisfactory religious aspiration and dogma but that, moreover, it has assumed the character and rôle of a religious institution. This could be done only in an age of transition from an age of faithlessness and frustrated isolation of the individual to an age of quest for solidarity at any price.

The desire for fellowship, sacrifice and self-surrender has been the spiritual basis upon which the Christian religion was mainly established. That desire exists to-day in the modern world, but the Church has failed to satisfy it. No interpretation of life will be equal to what men are demanding of it unless it can give to the individual an assurance of his value in society. It is true that Christianity has sought to offer this on the highest plane, but if for any reason it should fail to convince men of the sincerity of its message and of its practical possibilities, they will certainly

seek this satisfaction on a lower plane and the State will demand and will receive loyalty, not in the spiritual relations of citizenship, but in the name of blood, race, class or empire. In other words, race will aspire to fill the gap which has been created by the failure of the Church to be prophetically totalitarian in leadership, and understanding in its scope. It is indeed very largely owing to the fact that in recent centuries there has not been before the people any clear and accepted Christian basis of judgment upon society and the individual's place in it that the Totalitarian State has taken its rise. It would be manifestly unfair to blame the Church wholly or even mainly for this state of affairs. The Church has indeed failed, but only in common with mankind as a whole, for general confusion of thought has been brought about by the various philosophies which have succeeded and have contradicted each other, while in the sphere of economics the ruthless subjection of man to the machine has resulted in a lowering of intelligence and desire for thought, these in turn causing man's outlook to be limited to the material and to be totally unable to respond to the spiritual appeal of the Christian Faith.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

ANY review of the tendencies that appear in the development of European civilization, if it is to be at all complete, must begin with the ancient Græco-Roman world, and in this world the domination of aristocracy was fundamental. Their democracy itself was aristocratic, the slaves being despised as only fit to labour for the aristocrats, so that the latter might realize their ideals. Work, therefore, was despised and considered to be only fit for slaves. Consequently Plato and Aristotle, the greatest philosophers of Greece, did not realize that there was any evil or injustice in slavery. When the Stoics began to realize it, and to understand the truth of human brotherhood requiring recognition of the claims of all men, simply as men, it meant the decline of the aristocratic culture of antiquity.

With Christianity there came an entirely different attitude to labour. Christ himself was a carpenter, and with the Christian outlook contempt for work was morally untenable. There was indeed dignity in labour and every intellectual among the Jews must have a handicraft, St. Paul, for example, being a tentmaker. This Jewish attitude can be traced back to the Old Testament where, for instance, the Israelites were shepherds and their kings Saul and David were chosen from among those who tended asses and sheep, whereas to the Egyptians a shepherd was an abomination. With Jesus Christ the dignity of labour was established, the man himself, whatever his calling, provided only it was honest, having the dignity of a son of God.

The Græco-Roman world in its contempt for some forms of work has left us a conception of the qualitative value of

aristocratically creative work and this must be reconciled with the biblical and Christian idea of the holy nature of labour and of the equality of all men before God. The individual, therefore, ought by virtue of his ideals to transform labour in its effect upon him, and to render it as far as possible creative. Society, on the other hand, must strive to eliminate painful toil and must recognize the right of its members to work and to existence. The position of the individual in society, the nature of his work, the freedom or servitude of his spirit—these are the problems that from the beginning of civilization have agitated social systems down to the present time.

In the Middle Ages social life was entirely based on the principle of subordination. The Holy Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire, but mainly the former, spoke with authority on things spiritual and temporal. The State was subordinate to the Church and within the State itself the individual was under discipline and restraint, socially, politically, economically; there was the subjection of self to some group, obedience to the guild, to the lord, to the head of the family.

But from the fourteenth century onwards we see an awakening of the spirit of reflection, a quickening of criticism, a revolt against authority and tradition, a protest against absolutism and collectivism, a demand for freedom of thought, feeling and action. The State gradually superseded the Church and absorbed its functions as the organ of civilization: ecclesiasticism gave way to nationalism. In time the spirit of independence which attacked the authority of the Church in turn attacked the authority, even the paternalism, of the State, and there was a demand for equal rights, for democracy, and a growing tendency towards individualism. In the economic sphere the old guild system disappeared, the individual freed himself and demanded to be let alone in a system of free competition.

In the sphere of intellect, reason asserted itself, with the same hatred of tutelage and the same claim to have a free field. Truth was no longer regarded as something to be handed down by authority and tradition, but as something

to be acquired through free inquiry by the exercise of the reason and intellect. In the centuries immediately following the Middle Ages and culminating in the eighteenth century, the age of enlightenment, there was a supreme faith in the power of Reason, a keen interest in natural things and an intense desire for civilization and progress. Knowledge was desired not only for its own sake, but also for its utility, and as a means to power. The practical application of the results of scientific investigation was of supreme interest and importance and men looked forward to a new and wonderful era, consequent on achievements in the field of mechanics, natural science, medicine and social institutions. Reason was to unlock all doors for an enlightened humanity.

But the spirit of critical reason which had dethroned authority and tradition at last began to question its own foundations, and to be sceptical of its own power to reach a rational explanation of the universe as a whole. It had cast aside theology as useless lumber and now it also rejected philosophy as being unable to prove the existence of God, freedom, and immortality. Such questions were regarded as beyond man's power to know, for he was held to be limited to sense-perception, even then only reaching a high degree of probability.

This restriction of knowledge to the field of experience exercised a powerful influence on the current of thought, a sceptical and agnostic attitude being adopted towards philosophical inquiries. Natural science, as being the only field in which certainty could be attained, was pursued with intense interest, and remarkable practical results were achieved. In the last hundred years the world has seen the most wonderful progress in the application of the physical and biological sciences.

One result of the rejection of philosophy and the consequent glorification of the natural sciences was the revival of materialism. Men of scientific bent, forgetting that ultimate causes had been accepted as beyond human ken, began to apply scientific methods in the study of ultimate causes and to embrace materialistic world-views under the

label of scientific truth. The universe was regarded as innumerable particles of matter in motion, and though the problem of life itself and its wonderfully adapted organic forms was for many an obstacle to the acceptance of the mechanistic theory, yet when Charles Darwin brought forward his theory of evolution it was generally agreed to have smoothed away all difficulties. Evolutionistic materialism became the creed of the new scientific enlightenment.

Moreover, in the sphere of economics, free competition had not proved to be an unmixed blessing. By this system the stronger individuals had gained wealth and power, while the weaker ones found that they could not stand alone. The unrestricted application of *laissez faire*, which had for its object the development of a society of free individuals, resulted in a kind of economic bondage, which in turn necessitated the formation of trade-unions by working men in order to protect their interests.

The reaction from the individualism which had grown up in economics and industry, and which had created the most deplorable conditions for the workers is seen in the rapid rise of socialism in Europe. It was against this individualism and the spread of slavery that Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris and Marx in their different ways were directing the whole of their efforts. Moreover, the whole trend of science had been directed away from the idea of supernaturalism towards secularism. If a man disliked a thoroughgoing materialism he could now be an agnostic. Comte, Mill and Spencer were the founders of this new movement, getting their inspiration partly from Locke's empiricism and partly from Kant's critical philosophy. Comte, the French philosopher, founded what is known as Positivism, maintaining that human knowledge is limited to appearance (to phenomena) and that things in themselves are beyond our knowledge, therefore philosophers should give up the task of searching for the unknowable (Absolute) and should confine themselves to the search for scientific knowledge and the amelioration of human conditions.

Thus we get the rise of modern Humanism side by side

with a rapidly developing capitalist machine age, both in Europe and America. This was doubly bad and, indeed, it is now difficult to believe that the philosophy of Humanism as a background to the economics of the machine has not driven down ruthlessly the personality of the human to the lowest possible depths, whilst its assumption that the total relevance of man's life is confined to this world has undoubtedly distorted the economic motive, thereby confusing religious, social and economic aims.

It is not easy for men to believe in the sovereign personality of God when they have very little chance of developing their human personalities through the sheer repetitive monotony of the labour that masses of them have to do. It is often alleged that the great majority of workers prefer the monotonous labour, especially if it yields good wages, to the more skilled and more responsible work. That may be true, but then they are part of the whole system and entered it in their early days, and, in fact, many of them have known nothing else.

But the fundamental question is not whether this monotonous machine work yields good wages but whether it is good or bad for men as individuals and as citizens. Does it allow them to develop their personality to the highest possible level ? It does not : and moreover it even makes them unhappy though they are often quite unaware of the source of their unhappiness. It is not a question of whether men are satisfied to do this work or not. Probably the majority of slaves were quite satisfied to be slaves, and slavery would never have been abolished if men had waited for slaves to end it. Men must be made free to choose for themselves.

Again, it is urged that the method has given plenty and abolished poverty, and if you set out to give men more interesting work, you must keep them poor. It is probably true to say that the subjection of men to machines in any one particular industry may yield a relatively cheaper product but it is not true to say that the subjection of man's personality to the machine over the whole of industry makes for plenty. Indeed for every one master who thinks

of it in terms of plenty for the worker, thousands think of it in terms of profit to themselves, with the result that the workers' docility, inbred by sheer servitude to a machine, creates not plenty but scarcity, and through his contribution to the high production for making wealth, he ultimately finds himself in the ranks of the unemployed.

It is at this point that we reach the fundamental question of Democracy or Dictatorship. It is indeed the subjection of individual personality which has made Dictatorship in Europe not only so easy to achieve, but in the minds of large masses of the people such a reasonable form of government. In the economic and industrial spheres the masses are not free to think or act for themselves, and why in these circumstances should their passive minds not be willing to accept strong leadership in the political sphere?

In a real democracy men would have no need to rely upon political or any other dictators, but where are we to turn for real democracy to-day?—not to Britain or France or America. At the moment there are signs that these countries are awakening to the fact that there is a real conflict in the world between the ideals of Democracy and Dictatorship, and the question is whether this much-tried generation will be called upon to settle this ideological question in an out-and-out battle in which there shall be no peace or compromise, or whether these rival systems of government will be regarded as long-range questions which time alone can settle. Many people believe that the latter is unlikely, claiming that the policy of all dictators has been to uphold right and wrong equally with force and violence. Moreover, it is claimed that no State based upon racial persecution, religious intolerance, deprivation of free speech, with a conception of citizenship as constituting mere soulless parts of a state machine can survive for any length of time. Such a monstrosity, it is held, could not have existed at all but for the sheer weakness and failure of democracy in standing up to the tests imposed upon it by a modern capitalist machine age. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the two systems, despite their fundamental ideological differences, can work together

both in the field of international relations and economics and for the good of all concerned. In other words a policy of appeasement, it is held, is the only realistic line that can be taken, having regard to all the circumstances, which will give to the world peace and security in the future. Whichever of these views we accept, one thing seems clear, and it is this : if democracy is to survive it must be strengthened in its own rights and in its own merits. It must put personality before property, duties before rights, and justice before peace : it must, moreover, ally itself more closely to Christianity, of which it is the political and economic part, so that men will be free to choose for themselves, not only in religion and politics but in the sphere of economics as well.

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GENERAL INDEX

- Alaric the Bold, 10
 American Colonies, 41
 American War of Independence, 41, 43
 Anti-Semitism, 96, 101
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, xiv, 11, 12, 14
 Aristotle, 3, 5, 9, 25, 26, 110
 Augustine, St., 11, 15
 Austria, 42, 79, 87, 98

 Bacon, 27, 30, 51
 Benedict, St., 10
 Bentham, Jeremy, 59, 65
 Bergson, 101
 Biologists, 60
 Bismarck, 66, 98, 100
 Bohemia, 20
 Bolingbroke, 27
 "Boule," 2
 Bourbon rule, 43
 Brandenburg Prussia, 63
 Burke, Edmund, 43

 Cæsar, 13, 102
 Calvin, 18, 19, 24, 29
 Canon Law, 9, 14
 Canonists, 11, 14
 Carlyle, 59, 60, 61, 64, 113
 Cavour, 93
 Cervantes, 17
 Chalmers, 64
 Chartism, 59
 China, 32
 Christianity, 79, 84, 86, 94, 105, 110, 116
 Church of England, 23, 24, 104
 Church of Rome, 18, 89, 91, 96, 104, 106, 111
 Church of Scotland, 103
 Civil Society, 48

 Collectivism, 29, 81
 Columbus, 15
 Comintern, 85
 Communism, 9, 53, 68, 69, 81, 84, 85, 90, 96, 107
 Comte, 113
 Constantinople, 15
 Copernicus, 22
 Corporate State, 49
 Czarism, 81

 Danton, 42
 Dark Ages, 10
 Darwin, 52, 61, 113
 Declaration of Rights of Man (Rousseau), 42
 Democracy, 29, 72-9, 99
 Greek, 2-6
 Descartes, 30, 51
 Divine Right of Kings, 23, 25

 Elector, the Great, 97
 Electoral Reform, Act for (Italian), 88
 Epicurus, 7
 Erasmus, 17
 Euripides, 3

 Fabian Socialists, 60
 Fascism, 3, 9, 69, 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 87-101
 Fathers, Early, 14
 Ferdinand of Styria, 20
 Feuerbach, 54
 Fichte, 54
 Florence, 16
 Frederick the Great, 97-9
 Fronde Rebellion, 80

 Galileo, 22
 General Will, 29, 46, 47

- Geneva, 19, 29
 German Trade Union, 77
 Gobineau, 101
 Godwin, William, 43
 Gournay, 33, 44
 Great War, 67, 68, 95
 Guild Socialism, 90

 Habsburgs, 97
 Hardie, Keir, 64, 65
 Hegel, 45-54, 84, 90, 91, 101
 Heidelberg, 50
 Henry III, 97
 Herder, 44
 Hitler, Adolf, 94, 95, 96, 100, 107, 108
 Hitler Youth, 108
 Hobbes, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 62
 Hobson, J. A., 76
 Hohenzollern, 97
 Holy Roman Empire, 96, 97, 99, 111
 Hooker, 24
 Humanism, 113
 Hume, 31

 Independent Labour Party, 64
 Isis, 11
 Italy, 14, 87, 90-4

 Jena, 50
 Jesuits, 20
 Jews, 96, 110
 Jude, Martin, 64

 Kaminiev, 82
 Kant, 45, 113
 Kepler, 22
 Kierkegaard, 105

Laissez faire, 33, 62, 63, 113
 Languedoc, 38
 League of Nations, 86, 92, 93
 Lenin, 68, 80, 81, 82
 Liberal Reformers, 60
 Liberalism, 45, 62, 68, 93
 in Germany, 63, 93, 99
 Locke, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 62, 113
 Lorenzo the Magnificent, 16
 Louis XIII, 37
 Louis XIV, 38-44, 80

 Louis XV, 39, 40
 Louis XVI, 40, 41
 Loyola, 20
 Lucian, 9
 Luther, 17, 18

 Macchiavelli, xiv, 15, 16, 17
 Macdonald, Alexander, 64, 65
 Marat, 42
 Marco Polo, 2
 Marie Antoinette, 39, 40, 41, 42
 Marx, Karl, 34, 46, 48, 50, 52-8, 65, 86, 113
 Materialist Conception of History (Marx), 51, 84
 Mazzini, 93
 Mediæval Synthesis, 10, 12, 94
 Mercantilism, 63
 Metz, 14
 Middle Ages, 11, 12, 14, 94, 103, 111, 112
 Mill, James, 59
 Mill, John Stuart, 60, 113
 Milton, 23
 Mirabeau, 42
 Mithras, 11
 Montesquieu, 27
 Moors, 14
 More, Sir Thomas, 17
 Morris, 59, 60, 113
 Mussolini, 87-95, 106

 Nantes, Edict of, 41
 Napoleon, 42, 82-97, 98
 Nation State, 22, 23
 Nazi-ism, xiv, 79, 83, 95-101, 107
 Necker, 41
 Newton, Isaac, 7
 Nietzsche, 101
 Nonconformist Churches, 104

 Paine, Tom, 43
 Pan-Germanism, 99
 Paul, St., 7, 110
 Pericles, 3
 Physiocrats, 31, 32, 33, 34
 Pierre le Pauvre, 32
 Plato, 3-5, 9, 17, 110
 Plutocracy, 2
 Political Economy, 31
 Pope, the, 94, 95, 96
 Positivism, 113

- Praxiteles, 9
 Prussia, 42, 97, 98
 Puritans, 35

 Quesnay, 31

 Raskol (religion), 104, 105
 Reform Act, 44
 Reformation, 15, 17, 20, 103
 Renaissance, 15, 16
Republic, Plato's, 3, 4, 17
 Revocation of Edict of Nantes, 41
 Revolution, English, 23
 French, 36, 37, 41-5, 49, 69, 80, 99
 German, 93
 Industrial, 15, 30, 34, 59-65, 69
 Italian, 93
 Russian, 53, 68, 80, 82-4, 86
 Ricardo, 34, 55, 57, 60
 Robespierre, 42
 "Roi Soleil," 43
 Rome, 6, 11, 88
 Rousseau, 19, 28, 29, 42, 45, 46, 47
 Ruskin, 59, 60, 61, 64, 113
 Russian Church, 86

 Savonarola, 16
 Schiller, 44, 95
 Schleiermacher, 98
 Shakespeare, 27
 Smith, Adam, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 62

 Socialism, 29, 68, 76, 84, 86
 Socrates, 3
 Sorel, 89, 106
 Soviets, 82, 83, 85
 Spencer, 52, 113
 Stalin, 85
 States-General, 42
 Stein, Baron von, 98
 Stoicism, 7, 8, 110
 Sully, 31
 Syndicalism, 90

 Tarsus, 7
 Thirty Years' War, 20, 21
 Totalitarianism, 92, 107, 108
 Triple Alliance, 87
 Trotsky, 85
 Turgot, 33, 40, 41
 Turks, 14

 Utilitarians, 59, 60
Utopia, More's, 17

 Vauban, 31
 Vendée, 38, 42
 Versailles, Treaty of, 101
 Visigoths, 10

 Waterloo, 43
 Webb, Sydney, 86
 Weimar Republic, 77, 96
 Westphalia, Peace of, 20
 William I of Prussia, 98

 Zeno, 7

